Rhodesian COIN (consolidated thread, inc original RLI)

[JMA]

There are a great number of limitations that would make it difficult to translate the Fire Force of old into an effective counter-insurgent force for Afghanistan. Part of the problem is simple fact of training. We didn't fight that way before the Long War began (though I certainly advocated it some while ago), and trying to adapt to these tactics would require paradigm shifts of enormous proportion.that the Army and Marine Corps just simple cannot make these days.

I suggest that one takes baby steps on this. Identify one battalion (Ranger/Marine/Airbourne/whatever) and task them to set up a QRF starting in Helmand/Kandahar/whatever. Weld together with this unit the air effort required and do the training at all levels. It is important that the chopper air-crews stay with/train with/rotate with the soldiers - as in one big happy family under a non-negotiable unified command structure. More difficult with fixed wing support but efforts must be made to develop a cooperative relationship with them (best done over a few beers).

Of course such an approach will need unwavering support from the theatre commander... otherwise don't waste your time.

Once there is a record of success other units will cut each others throats to get a chance get assigned to any new QRF (Fire Force) that may be established. The first success will be when they arrive (like the cavalry of old) to pull some callsign out of the sh** and in the process dispatching a bunch of bad guys for good measure.

I think it's a bit off course to reference holding rural territory in the title of article. The Rhodesian Security Forces in the form of the Scouts/RLI/RAR were not holding territory as much as they were interdicting the infiltration of the terr gangs coming from across the border. Once they got far enough, the difficulties of countering and killing them became magnified by a significant factor. For some reason, I remember a reference or statement somewhere that it became 4x harder to make kills once the gang had made it to certain regions of the TTLs.

Yes, the use of the word 'holding' seems a bit strange.

For the pseudo thing to work one needs local population to interact with and 'fool' into believing they are the real deal. It was all about the real time intel. If you had it and you acted upon it immediately you got results no matter where they were located. Once done that 'team' would generally be compromised in that area and would have to be redeployed elsewhere.

Of course the best time to hit them is before they cross the border (in their supposed sanctuary).

The sparsely populated flat areas as found in the south-east (for example) that were used as transit areas were better suited to the Grey Scouts (mounted infantry) to cross grain for spoor and if found have the FF position closer for a quick response to exploit the results of any contact they may have. (The Grey's Scouts came into their own too late in the war to have a real impact but the potential was there.)

One of the problems (as it were) that we experienced was that as the FF got busy (like called out everyday) we were unable to sleep out and conduct aggressive follow-ups of those who escaped. There were not always suitable follow-up troops available to hand over to so the survivors unlike in the earlier days when the remnants of the CT group contacted could sustain more losses in subsequent contacts. So it became the norm to recover all troops at night, feed them steak, eggs and fries (I kid you not) washed down by a few 'frosties' (cold beers) and a good nights sleep and ready for the next days fun. (If we were lucky and were able to deal with the CTs quickly we were often back in time for tea and a game of football or baseball (or even run around the airfield if the day was not too tiring) at the airfield before dinner.)

But essentially you are correct in that the longer the CTs were in the country the easier they found it to get lost among the population.

Insurgent mobility is widely different between gangs of ZIPRA/ZANLA coming across the borders, and how Afghan insurgents move and operate, so that has to be considered as well.

Yes, its an enemy and terrain issue.

Finally, as strange as it may sound the guys who may have the best grasp of what is required for FF type operations are the the Air Force Search & Rescue guys. Think about what they need to do and how they put troops on the ground to extract downed airmen while covering them from the air.