Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
Yep, it makes sense in that Aviation unit commanders should be officers, mostly but not all. I prefer NCO to the Warrant Officer usage so I'd say most Pilots should be NCOs and not Officers. Most everyone fell into Officers as pilots way back when due to the education variance. Those days are gone. As I've reminded you before, we used to ride to work on Elephants -- we quite and not just because the Parking Lot Attendants got upset...
Most armies live with the archaic remnants of a class system as reflected in their rank structure. In many cases it has become so ingrained that it has become accepted by all. The Israelis have made an effort to produce a more egalitarian approach which works for them under their circumstances.

In the British military the significantly reduced numbers of the in-bred upper class no longer find the military and attractive option due to the presence of significant numbers of middle-class 'usurpers' and the requirement to actually spend more time soldiering than on 'hunting, shooting and fishing' (and the pay is not good).

Most armies need to use a flame thrower to clean out their systems and shake off these relics of a past social order.

Not what I said and you know it -- I said it's not necessary for an Officer to serve as a Platoon Leader, not that he should not command troops on a mission basis and live with them for months at a time. We want to put them in the same environment and for some time, we just would do it slightly differently. Personally, I think all of 'em should serve as Troopies for a bit -- but that's another thread...
This butterfly approach that the US military seem to apply to officer postings where they flit from one post to the next without spending enough time in any one to benefit significantly from the experience.

On a 'mission basis'? How would that work? What period are we talking about here? Why this sub-optimal solution when the obvious one stares you in the face?

I went the route of first serving in the ranks. First did my conscript training in SA, followed by full recruit training (20 weeks) followed by six months operational, followed by full 12 month officers course (then some years later was myself course officer on a 12 month officers course). I believe I understand the process differences in the training approach.

As stated before elsewhere on SWC time in an officers career is precious. Recruit training teaches one to be a rifleman in an infantry platoon. Recruits re not taught section and platoon level tactics and platoon weapons employment. Officer cadets are and their training in this aspect is totally from the perspective of commanding. That they will during the training take part in section and platoon attacks in probably close to all the possible positions from basic rifleman to platoon commander is essential in the training of young officers. It is for this main reason (as I stated before) that one can not reduce officer training courses by the length of a recruit course where candidates have been through that mill already.

My personal experience (of first doing a recruit course and then serving some operational time) was such that I would make it an essential route to a commission if I were so able. The minimum of a year is well spent in that. Is there a maximum? Probably three years where the entry age was 18.

I can understand your understanding - and I can agree with it from the standpoint of the Commonwealth Armies. From the standpoint of the US Army, time spent as a platoon leader is currently almost superficial, it is a way station and for many not a particularly enjoyable one (which is an absolute pity and an indictment of the way we do things here...). My comments re: the field Grades is based on the US model. I can't speak to SA or Rhodesia but I have worked with, seen and freely acknowledge the Strynes, Canadians and British do a better job -- that's mostly because they use their NCOs, particularly Sergeants Major (Co and higher...), correctly -- we too often do not.
First of all the South African military organisation was a complete shambles. Luckily it never had to deploy in any sizable numbers. Based on National Servicemen (all white males were conscripted for two years) with total reliance on reservists (the Citizen Force and Commandos) as commanded by bureaucratic Permanent Force (no troopies just what they called a 'leader group' most no better than your average civil servant) one can be grateful that the war in SWA/Namibia and in Angola required a relative few competent officers to prosecute. And yes there were the required number of skilled and competent officers and SNCOs to drive the war using reserve and conscript troops. Grateful too that the enemy was low grade local riff-raff with slightly better but very poor quality Cubans. Probably the best out of the South Africans were the artillery who with their G5/G6 guns were magnificent.

Rhodesia worked pretty much according to the British system but had much more flexibility to adapt to the developing war situation as it was unencumbered by suffocating tradition and bureaucratic restraint. There were still many problems some of which were adequately addressed (some not).

Now because the majority of young US officers have a superficial platoon commanding experience that does not mean that this experience (certainly in the war environments recently and currently available) is not without value. If nobody has it then you are in no position to miss it. To agree that it has value would imply that the US officer corps is somehow lacking which is not about to be acknowledged anytime soon.