Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
1936? Prior to the Spanish Civil War? Why do you take that seriously?

Doesn't matter, I will look it up sometime. They surely did not pay much attention to CAS, though.
Because that's when they developed the doctrine (although it was a process that began after World War I). I take it seriously because it was there. They also had effective measures in place as early as 1917. Deciding to ignore it (as some Luftwaffe commanders certainly did) doesn't mean they didn't have the doctrine. And because AAC efforts worked in some places and cases doesn't mean they actually had good doctrine, no matter what the postwar spin might claim.

If you look at the AAC, they had a vested interest in making interdiction and strategic bombardment work, because that was part of their cornerstone for an independent air force. CAS...not so much. But to get back to Ganluv's question, there were a number of reasons why Allied ground commanders appeared 'squirrely' about using CAS. Coordination wasn't always idea, communications weren't always great, and sometimes the aircraft just weren't made available. When it worked, it tended to work OK (with some exceptions). The sad thing is that little of that was actually preserved in the postwar period and had to be relearned.