Is concern a function of ethnicity or a function of assessment of threat relative to other concerns? I doubt there's a uniform level of concern even among Indians... some would be very concerned, some unconcerned, and a wide spectrum in between.Originally Posted by Ray
Speaking of "the Filipinos" is too simplistic to be relevant. "The Filipinos" didn't throw the US out, the faction that opposed the presence of large permanent facilities gained ascendency over the faction that supported that presence. There's still a general consensus that large permanent facilities are not wanted. US troops have been on Philippine soil on a rotational basis for over a decade, since well before the current round of the China flap started... nothing at all new about that and no reason to say Filipinos are suddenly "eating crow" over it.
It's worth remembering that Clark Air Base was not closed by Filipinos, but by geology: the Pinatubo eruption forced the abandonment of the base. It was actually kind of amusing: for years the US had been saying that a phaseout would take a decade, when the planet decided to pop a zit the Air Force was gone in 3 days. The negotiations over Subic ended when the Philippine government demanded a price higher than the US was willing to pay: without Clark and without the Cold War the value of the place had dropped significantly. It wasn't quite that they "they threw the US out without any hesitation", more that they overrated their negotiating position.
Nobody has floated the idea of rotating 4k Marines through here locally, and I don't bet anyone wants to try: it would be a very difficult topic politically. The idea of putting them in forward bases in Sulu and Zamboanga seems most unlikely to me. Certainly there's been no local discussion of any such thing, and I doubt the US would even want to do it. Messy idea.
They might do it as a trade to get something they want from the US. If the US wants to move some troops here and the Philippine government thinks it can get some hardware, aid, or other concessions, they'll make a deal, to the limited extent that local politics will let them get away with it. Less about defending them from China than about seizing an opportunity to make some advantageous deals.
Almost nobody thinks that China would invade under any circumstances. What's expected is more pushing and shoving over fishing territories, and (much more hypothetically) occasional pushing and shoving over resource related exploration/production. It's already pretty well established that the US is not going to defend Filipino fishing fleets or offshore claims, so there's really not much to be gained beyond negotiating leverage with all parties concerned.
There's a stage of war where the American popular response is "we must rally together and stick behind the leader". At a later stage this becomes "this is stupid and pointless, throw the bastard out".
Filipinos think all kinds of ways, so do Anglo-Saxons and Hans. That has less to do with some genetically enforced mode of thought than by the backgrounds of the individuals involved. An urban Filipino businessman or professional thinks very much like an urban American businessman or professional; they have more in common than either would have with a farmer from their own country. There is no such thing as "how Filipinos think", they think all kinds of ways. True of most people once you look beyond stereotypes. It would be silly for anyone, even a Filipino, to claim to know "how Filipinos think". I have a fairly good grasp of the spectrum of opinion here and the current state of balance/imbalance among various points on that spectrum.
Diplomatic dialogues aren't necessary because different cultures have inherently different thought processes, they're necessary because people in different places have divergent interests.
Wasn't meant to shake the earth, only to point out that the rise of China is a quite minor consideration to most Filipinos.
Again, I see no special evidence that any of what's happening is driven by US strategy. I see nations responding to a situation in ways that suit their own perceived interests. The Philippine government is using the US concern with China to try and move up the US military aid totem pole.
The only country in SE Asia that's developing a serious military response to a perceived Chinese threat is Vietnam. That's predictable, and it's not driven by anything the US wants or does. The Vietnamese have a history with China, geographic proximity, a land border, and a long China Sea coastline. There's been a lot of attention paid to occasional military exercises with the US, but the Vietnamese are by no means settling into a US camp. Their arms purchases, notably anti-ship missiles, are generally from Russia. There's also a good deal of cooperation with India: Vietnam is negotiating to buy cruise missiles that are made in India (joint venture with Russians), and I've heard they'll be working with India for training crews for the 6 Kilo-class subs they're buying; there's also talk of energy deals with Indian companies.
The Vietnamese are actually being quite clever about it, as one might expect: they've no shortage of experience in conflict with much larger powers. They aren't setting up to fight the Chinese Navy, but they are laying out an asymmetric strategy to convince the Chinese that the cost of conflict would exceed the gain. None of this is driven by US strategy, it's the Vietnamese government responding to a perceived threat in the way they think will be most effective. Part of that response is closer relations with the US, but that's not the only part.
OPEC was broken up (to the extent that it has been) by the 90s oil glut, not by the US.
I wish I could attribute the Arab Spring, the fall of Gaddafi, etc to US initiation, but I really can't: American politicians are neither that smart nor that competent, and they don't look that far ahead. Things happen, the US responds, usually clumsily.
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