I think that is where your perception is at odds with reality Carl.
The Afghans didn't put their trust in us as much as they simply rode the fence, used our do-good attitude and largess to their benefit, and got the handouts we gave.
Where there were not enough handouts, they were more than happy to point out where the boogeyman was, to make sure we understood the degree of instability in their neighborhoods, whether it be Kabul or the Korengal, imagined or real. Our COIN principles ensured we did something about resolving the "instability" as quickly as we could muster the manpower and the money. Successive unit rotations didn't move the chains as much as they simply held on to a 9-5 semblance of security until the sun went down.
There is a reason why Mullah Omar came to power, and that will be part of the Taliban's (or similar incarnation) resurgence when we leave.
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