Al Qaeda and other salafi jihadis do not see the upheaval of the Arab Spring as the death knell for their movement. Rather, they believe that they will be able to capitalize on the chaos in definable ways, and that their enemies have suffered significant geopolitical setbacks. As previously stated, one cannot take jihadi perceptions of the Arab Spring at face value as representing the true reality. These perceptions are laced with hubris, and frequently conflate the movement’s aspirations with on-the-ground reality. Yet the same can be said of Western analysts who definitively declare the jihadi movement dead: their own proclamations are likewise frequently hubristic, and project their own aspirations upon the events in question.
As McCants has noted, the Arab Spring presents “both promise and peril for the global jihadist movement.” Some of this peril is related to factors that McCants has noted, such as the emergence of Islamist parliamentarians. Other perils may relate to justifications for the use of violence. If extreme salafis embrace strategies of electoral politics and persuasion, does the raison d’être of jihadi groups recede? Although these challenges may be looming, jihadis were less concerned about them during the first year of statements on the Arab Spring, and far more interested in the perceived opportunities presented to the movement.
Our analysis of 101 significant documents produced by jihadi thinkers highlights a rather complex and detailed understanding of the ramifications of the uprisings. This understanding includes a developed outlook regarding the geopolitics of regime change; an assessment of specific advantages that the jihadi movement might enjoy; and a developing doctrine regarding the movement’s goals, and strategy to attain those goals, in the post-revolution world. Without understanding how jihadis view the uprisings, we will be at a great disadvantage in attempting to predict the future of the salafi jihadi movement.
Jihadists on the Arab Spring
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