http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/b...4/benghazi.pdf

Published January 15, 2014

U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Review of the Attacks on U.S. Facilities.

Hopefully this report will both raise some concerns with Department of State security practices and quell the endless conspiracy theories. Mistakes were clearly made, but some mistakes have been mis-contributed to intentional action versus the fog of war.

It clearly states there were numerous and substantiated reports of Al-Qaeda linked groups operating in Libya, and the increasing threat they posed to the U.S. facilities. The CIA acted on these threats and beefed up the security at their facilities, while the Ambassodor's request for increased security were not acted upon.

The military was preparing to sending troops, but by the time they were prepared to deploy the folks at Benghazi were long evacuated (that is reality that most people in the military get when you're deploying from a cold start).

It is important to acknowledge at the outset that diplomacy and intelligence collection are inherently risky, and that all risk cannot be eliminated. Diplomatic and intelligence personnel work in high-risk locations all over the world to collect information necessary to prevent future attacks against the United States and our allies. Between 1998 (the year of the terrorist attacks against the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania) and 2012, 273 significant attacks were carried out against U.S. diplomatic facilities and personnel. 1 The need to place personnel in high-risk locations carries significant vulnerabilities for the United States. The committee intends for this report to help increase security and reduce the risks to our personnel serving overseas and to better explain what happened before, during, and after the attacks.
The Committee explored claims that there was a "stand down" order given to the security team at the Annex. Although some members of the security team expressed frustration that they were unable to respond more quickly to the Mission compound, the Committee found no evidence of intentional delay or obstruction by the Chief of Base or any other party.
The Annex was the CIA facility, their security personnel did respond as quickly as possible.

The mortar fire was particularly accurate, demonstrating a lethal capability and sophistication that changed the dynamic on the ground that night. According to testimony by the Chief of Base, it was only after this third wave of attacks, when the mortars hit, that he decided it was necessary to evacuate the personnel from the Annex.
At least some the attackers were well trained, this clearly wasn't poorly trained militia member casually hip firing a mortar.

FINDING #1: In the months before the attacks on September 11, 2012, the IC provided ample strategic warning that the security situation in eastern Libya was deteriorating and that U.S. facilities and personnel were at risk in Benghazi.
FINDING #2: The State Department should have increased its security posture more significantly in Benghazi based on the deteriorating security situation on the ground and IC threat reporting on the prior attacks against Westerners in Benghazi including two incidents at the Temporary Mission Facility on April 6 and June 6, 2012.
On July 9, 2012, Stevens sent a cable to State Department headquarters
requesting a minimum of 13 "Temporary Duty" (TDY) U.S. security
personnel for Libya, which he said could be made up of DS agents, DoD
Site Security Team (SST) personnel, or some combination of the two.
The State Department never fulfilled this request and, according to Eric Nordstrom, State Department headquarters never responded to the request with a cable.
In an August 16, 2012, cable to State headquarters, Stevens raised
additional concerns about the deteriorating security situation in Benghazi
following an Emergency Action Committee (EAC) meeting held on
August 15, 2012, in Benghazi.

( 1) The Principal Officer "remarked that the security situation in
Benghazi was 'trending negatively"' and "that this daily pattern of
violence would be the 'new normal' for the foreseeable future
(2) A CIA officer "briefed the EAC on the location of approximately ten
Islamist militias and AQ training camps within Benghazi."
(3) The Principal Officer and a CIA officer "expressed concerns with the
lack of host nation security to support the U.S. Mission [facility]."
I'm quite familiar with chaos and confusion in the heat of the moment, but this wasn't that. The red flag was sent up prior to the event more than once and it was ignored. I have a hard time accepting that department leadership ignored their people in harm's way when they requested a modest increase in security. The report later went on to say there was considerable confusion on who had the authority within State to make the decision.


In contrast, the CIA, in response to the same deteriorating security situation and IC threat reporting, consistently upgraded its security posture over the same time period. Specifically, the attack on the British Ambassador's convoy by a rocket-propelled grenade on June 11, 2012, led to a CIA security audit of the Annex. As a result, CIA quickly implemented additional security measures due to the threat of continued attacks against Western personnel in Benghazi.
The Committee has reviewed the allegations that U.S. personnel, including in the IC or DoD, prevented the mounting of any military relief effort during the attacks, but the Committee has not found any of these allegations to be substantiated. The following assets were deployed or in the process of deploying in response to the Benghazi attacks (based on a review of DoD documents and testimony before the Committee):
- one unarmed Predator was diverted to provide surveillance coverage of the Temporary Mission Facility as it was being attacked. This Predator was subsequently replaced by another Predator to enable the first Predator to return to base for refueling
- A seven-person security team (consisting of two DoD personnel, four
CIA personnel, and a linguist) flew from the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli to
Benghazi and successfully helped evacuate the Americans from the
Annex to the airport.
- Two FAST teams were ordered to deploy, one for Benghazi, but by the time they were ready, and then add the flight time it would have been too late (post evacuation)
- Special Operations units were ordered to deploy, but they couldn't get there until after the U.S. personnel in Benghazi were evacuated.