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Thread: Iraq: Out of the desert into Mosul (closed)

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  1. #11
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    Quote Originally Posted by carl View Post
    Joel:

    When I said "...I've read they've done a bunch of the idiot things we did in the beginning until we wised up.", I should have added that I read it at your site, Musings On Iraq. You do a brilliant job.
    Carl---here is the reasoning behind my comment and JWing actually indirectly confirms my comments to be accurate.

    Where in the entire new and even in the old FM 3-24 is it in bold letters on the first page stated "Beware if the host nation does not follow the intent and goals of COIN to the exact letter the US Army follows it it is doomed to failure".

    Basically JWing is admitting that even with all the mentoring, COIN classes for their troops and officers, even being trained in our COIN image and armed as we were--nothing was absorbed as JWing admits.

    So looking back --what was exactly wrong and why was that failure not mentioned anywhere in the COIN manuals old and new?

    Interesting we as a Force always talk as if COIN was a magic potion that will always succeed-but nowhere in all the COIN chatter and FMs is discussed the possibility that in the end the target population and their governance may just not want COIN to succeed for whatever reasons---or did I miss that discussion and or did I miss that paragraph in the new FM?

    Not so silly was my comment after 4.6 KIAs and over thousands wounded not to count the maimed for life.

    The comments concerning just why AQI was not eliminated in Mosul is interesting especially after the 2/3ACRs took beatings in calming it down and since JSOC was constantly targeting AQI members in Mosul?

    Go back and read all media reporting during and after the surge---those narratives talk about "successes" not failures in driving AQI out --even the JSOC narrative is along the same lines.

    So did we start believing our own PR as by 2008 the Force/National Command Authority wanted a way out?

    Lastly we are talking a lot about ISIS but the largest by member count Sunni insurgency group was the Islamic Army in Iraq (IAI) who would often clash with AQI but in the end often worked together with them---they have not/never did "disappear"---they did come out under a new name and were by 2009 undergoing a fairly robust paramilitary training program which if one looks closely maybe the reason for the new effectiveness of the ISIS successes as ISIS has effectively made the transition from a so called "terrorist" group to fighting effectively as a army---almost Mao like.

    I have always when in Iraq said to anyone who would listen but actually not many did---whoever trains the Iraq's to fight for a "flag" will be dominant-ISIS is fighting for a "flag" whether we like it or not.
    Last edited by OUTLAW 09; 06-12-2014 at 06:52 AM.

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