There have been few detailed descriptions in Western publications of the campaign by the Ukrainian Army to expel the Russian inspired separatists from East Ukraine. What first started in mid-April 2014 as a low level insurgency led by Russian GRU spetsnaz operatives that was centered in an urban bastion named Sloviansk, has since transformed into essentially a conventional war between 30,000 attacking Ukrainians against 10,000 defending Russians in an area 9,000 square miles in size, which encompasses numerous cities, one of them a one million plus metropolis - the City of Donetsk. From what I have been able to extrapolate from sketchy press releases from the Ukrainian armed forces and the more detailed but yet unverified situation reports from the Russian commanders, the Ukrainians, while tactically unsophisticated, have acquired enough combat experience to mount what, by all accounts is a rather elegant and nuanced campaign. The Ukrainians have initiated simultaneous battalion sized armored maneuvers on multiple fronts to spread out the defenders. The operation has also revealed attempts to control tempo and timing of sequential attacks. The Ukrainians also sent a brigade-sized mechanized column in a daring (and perhaps ill advised) flanking maneuver to try to seal off the Russian border. These troops are now trapped against the border for over two weeks but are still dug in and resupplied by parachute drop. (The Ukrainian Chief of the General Staff, General Muzychko, has decided to ignore the pleas of these troops for a relief offensive and has shifted reserves elsewhere) The Russians have proved to be the better infantry commanders (all are veterans of the Chechen Wars, Bosnia and Georgia) and have orchestrated a daring maneuver themselves when 1500 escaped from encirclement in Sloviansk at the very last moment. However, Ukrainian armor and artillery crews have gradually acquired competence and have buttressed their unreliable mech infantry with volunteer battalions, which make up for their lack of training with enthusiasm. (The mech infantry is comprised of recruits, while the specialists are contract soldiers) Throughout, the separatists have utilized state-of-the art MANPADS, with which they have downed some 10 attack helicopters and 6 attack warplanes. Despite the heavy losses, the small and outdated Ukrainian air force continues to fly 10-15 close air support sorties daily, with noticeable effect. Moreover, the Russians have used Kornet and Konkurs anti-tank missiles against Ukrainian tanks (upgraded old T-64s). The separatists have also acquired close to 100 T-64 and T-72 tanks themselves, with generous numbers of artillery and rockets, all smuggled over the border from Russia. As we all know, recently they even acquired BUK anti-air systems, with tragic results to passengers of Malaysian Airlines. Casualties so far amount to approximately 1,500 to 2,000 KIA and wounded on each side. As always, the big killer in the steppe is massed artillery. In fact, the Russians have fired artillery support from across the border. As of today, July 25, 2014, the Ukrainians appear to have turned the flank of a strong redoubt in Horlivka (which opens the way towards Donetsk from the north) and are close to seizing an important road junction at Debaltsevo, along a key supply line. All of these names would have been familiar to WWII era Red Army and Wehrmacht commanders, as bloody battles were fought to seize and to hold these locations in the Great Patriotic War. If Russia does not intervene directly or injects substantial irregular reinforcements soon (at least 5,000), the Ukrainians may have their first ever victorious campaign against Russia in history. (They won a few small battles in 1919 but never a war) One of the ironies of this entire struggle is that the people of Donetsk now realize that Putin never intended to liberate them and, to the contrary, has ruined their region economically for years to come. Ukraine looks like a better option and many are starting to see Kyiv as the lesser of two evils. Putin's adventures in Crimea and Donetsk have led to unintended consequences; (1) a Ukraine unified for the first time in its history, regardless of language (many of the Ukrainian fighters speak Russian; the orders in the Ukrainian army at the tactical level are issued in Russian);(2) the growth of national myths forged in a war with Russia that may develop into a true Ukrainian nationalism (and a break from Russia once and for all) and (3) disenchantment with Putin among nationalist voters in Russia proper (most of the blue collar population) which may threaten his hold on political power at the next election. There is some talk of Igor Strelkov, the Russian field commander in Donetsk, as a viable alternate candidate (unless Putin has him killed at the front). In any case, this war holds valuable lessons regarding the effectiveness of MANPADS against tactical air as well as the dynamics of a conventional war where neither side has air superiority. It offers a conflict involving urban warfare as well as broad mechanized maneuver and where artillery is still the king of battle.