I too was heavily influenced by "Once a Warrior King." I look forward to this next book, and I do not say that about much that is published about COIN in recent years.

Insurgency is fundamentally a bottom-up response to a top-down problem. Far too much of our US COIN in Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan and many smaller efforts has been focused on protecting and preserving the top-down drivers of insurgency at the policy level; while employing a form of COIN that seeks through various means to quell the bottom-up response. Needless to say the results have been predictable - many vignettes of tremendous tactical (temporary and usually local) successes, all in support of an effort that ultimately fails to meet the desired strategic objectives.

I am confident that these will be rock solid insights and that the book will be a great read - but like all of our lessons learned from US COIN efforts we should always place a large asterisk on the cover with the following warning: "The tremendous efforts and sacrifice described herein were in support of an overall operation that ultimately failed in its strategic goals and purpose."

This is certainly true of the lessons learned from the last decade of war that is used to validate much of the Army's new operating concept, ironically titled "How to win in a Complex World." We have to get better at how we think about the problem, and that will be my primary focus as I pore through David's latest work - searching for clues and insights that help me in the continued pursuit of understanding the problem of insurgency more clearly.