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Thread: Recognizing Distinct Types of Insurgency - "Know the type of conflict you are in."

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  1. #30
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    The Journal has a new item and slant on a recurring topic: ‘Reorganization is Imperative to Fixing Special Forces’ Bent Unconventional Culture’:http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art...tional-culture

    The author focuses on language and linguistics as an important factor in the overall problem. That seems valid because although a political cartoon may convey a lot without words few people can succeed in doing the same. However the Pentagon has certainly managed to do just that.

    (This item was intended for Doctrine and TTPS but threads such as Counter – Unconventional Warfare, Thrashing about is not a strategy, The Joint Planning Process were all closed. Active threads were preoccupied with COIN. This thread has the first appropriate title but have not read all its items.)

    It’s now easy to distinguish the special trooper. “ Yes he’s the one wearing the big helmet and mosquito net with half a pair of opera glasses and the single ear headset for road safety, multi-colour sunscreen, big wristwatch and sweat bands and mittens, modish scarf over the blotchy but stylishly slit Jean Paul G stretch combo, the cowboy’s holster on the belt with the big knife and hatchet, handcuffs and baton and large bunch of coloured cable ties, with soft lunch bag and drink flasks. Then over the waistcoat with the rifle magazines, energy drink and fruit pouches there’s the cute shortie over-and-under shotgun between the speckled binoculars and the computer phone with a screen, the big rifle on one shoulder with a can on the end to keep out the rain and the vacuum cleaner squeegie thingie on the other shoulder together with the bent antenna. The coloured patches are to show who is the boss of each group and for all skills other than spoken and written American English and math. “

    The Pentagon chiefs and their political chiefs - and similarly the chiefs of other ABCA nations - have apparently forgotten how to task organise, exercise and commit joint force units. One result has been the growth of Special Forces harvesting vitality and particularly extracting rather than extricating it from single service special units. If that continues SpecFor will become larger than the USMC leading each next set of chiefs to dream up a special SpecForCom.

    Possibly the long-term task organisation of SpecForCom - as distinct from strike-oriented single and joint force units - should consist of at the largest 100-person SpecFor teams each specialised in one language/ethno area with integral mobility using ag-bikes up to at most 3-tonne GP vehicles – some with discrete armour but without an electric generator for high capacity comms. Then as indicated or if needed promptly add for later subtraction sub-units from single forces as needed, exercise and deploy with no higher than a major in local command. Possibly a LTCOL with 6 staff in country and almost always at the embassy or consulate keeping tabs on several separate teams, but limited to 20 hours per week in the field. If not enough then more area-specialised teams and at most a Colonel with 10 staff at the embassy, again with at most 20 hours per week in the field. If still more commitment is warranted then send in a USMC force up to the size of a MAGTF.

    The Pentagon knows that special forces have to be engaged in difficult business and that small can be useful. But it commonly scores B for effort and E for brain. SpecForCom has been enthusiastically and energetically glamourised and made popular with the electorate. And the Pentagon is now almost duty bound to continue feeding an overlarge gorilla when smooth and cut-down guerillas are needed. The way many politically contentious decisions seem to be made indicates that rectification is likely to be delayed until some administration after the current one has gone. Some pragmatists like Jean Larteguy might understand but many long-dead and some recently dead senior executives would be seriously displeased and for the long term.

    So how might a SpecForCom be made effective or more effective without damaging the rest of a national security infrastructure ? Use skill in languages to determine suitability for what precisely or approximately ? Is that the right type of straight line for a reorganization and just how many straight lines are needed ?
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 07-04-2015 at 09:45 AM. Reason: Add link to cited SWJ article

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