Mark Clodfelter also does a very good job examining the air war in Vietnam. He makes one of the best points to counter the critics of the early air war -- the argument that it was too restrained, particularly the interdiction piece -- by pointing out that there simply were not enough targets. The predominant force in the early years was the VC/NLF, and they managed to fight on 35 tons of supplies per day. That translates into 7 deuce and a half trucks -- but probably more like a couple of hundred bicycles -- and such targets are not well-suited to air delivered ordnance, or interdiction of any sort.
This also explains why the air war was more successful under Nixon -- the decimation of the VC/NLF after Tet means more is coming from the North, and they are shifting to a more conventional form of war -- plus, Nixon is dealing with China, so the latter's support to the North is waning a bit. (At the other end, the early campaigns against the North _help_ that regime -- helps them to get assistance from the Soviets and the Chinese -- NVN GDP rises during Rolling Thunder.)
He also argues that the AF would not have conducted the air campaign much differently if it had been in charge.
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