Certainly, (pro)Russian forces have deliberately attacked civilians and civilian property in Donbas and then blamed the collateral damage on Ukrainian forces. The problem in Donbas, particularly if the more indirect client model of Kremlin control is accurate (as opposed to direct control in Syria and Crimea), is that neither side has very good precision strike capabilities, and both are using weapons and doctrines that are not designed to account for civilians and their property in a battlespace. (Pro)Russian units have deliberately used civilians as human shields when it comes to staging areas for their armor and artillery and have stationed snipers in inhabited apartment buildings, with the objectives of either protecting their forces from Ukrainian fire or drawing that fire toward civilians in order to whip up support for their mafia statelets. Note that the (pro)Russian precision strike capabilities are superior to the Ukrainians because of their abilities to use UAVs for reconnaissance and to disrupt Ukrainian ISR with advanced EM warfare. Kyiv is between a rock and a hard place when it comes to avoiding collateral damage, and Donetsk, Luhansk and Moscow know this.

Moscow has already attempted to coerce Kyiv into rebuilding Donbas, even as Moscow’s own “humanitarian aid” consists of weapons for the rebels, SOF and intelligence infiltrators and the ransacking of Donbas’ industrial equipment. It may very well be in Kyiv’s interest to ignore the region entirely and focus on economically developing the rest of Ukraine, although I doubt the rebels or Moscow would take this quietly.

Washington has received a great deal of criticism for not giving more support to Ukraine, however, I would counter that the American response has been restrained for 2 reasons: (1) Washington wants to distinguish an attack on NATO from an attack on a country with which the US has no security commitment; and (2) Washington is signaling that not every conflict is its priority. There was a period during which the US military was perceived as the “world’s policeman” and that almost every country was of serious interest, regardless of the preferences of the other great powers. I don’t agree with the term, “unipolar moment”, as this implies that there were no other great powers and that the US had a free hand everywhere, when in fact, the US was simply not challenged in the non-aligned Third World in the same manner that it had been during the Cold War. That period has passed given the rise of China and reconstruction of Russia, and because Americans are no longer willing to pay, fight and die for non-core interests after the Iraq debacle. To get back on topic, I do believe that if the (pro)Russians advanced on Kharkiv or Mariupol, NATO arms (especially ATGMs, EW devices and counter-battery radars) and trainers would flow into Ukraine, forcing Russia to either fully commit itself or withdraw. While Ukrainian servicemen are being killed and injured daily, the Ukrainian nation is much culturally stronger and socially cohesive than at any time since independence.

All I can say about Syria is that I hope Russia has an adequate protection program for its pilots post-deployment, as many will be hunted down in Russia by Islamists. They know what they’re doing, and so they shouldn’t be surprised if vengeance finds them in cozy retirement years from now.

The Russian economy is certainly under pressure and Russians are increasingly feeling the pinch of sanctions and low energy prices, however, Russia’s economy is still robust, the central bank has substantial reserves, and economic growth is expected to return (albeit very low) by 2017. Note that Iran was under much more severe sanctions for much longer, and it continues to be debated whether or not the sanctions/low oil prices brought them to the table or whether Washington gave in to strike the JCPOA. International sanctions did not oust Hussein from Iraq or the Kim dynasty from North Korea, although they were so successful against Japan in the late 1930s that Tokyo regarded them as an act of war by the US.

I believe that Putin jumped the gun on Crimea, as there was no evidence that the Black Sea Fleet was about to be evicted or that Crimeans’ ties to Russia would be severed. The rationale for invasion and annexation, based upon anti-Russian language policy never enacted and oppression from Ukrainian security forces that numbered 1/3 of Russian forces in Crimea, was spurious. The annexation of Crimea, together with the launching of a dirty war in Donbas, has only brought Ukraine firmly into the Western camp which is contrary to Putin’s goals. Nevertheless, Ukraine has not yet proven to be his Waterloo and the Russian people have tended to support his folly.

I think that Washington is trying a compartmentalized approach to dealing with Moscow: cooperating in some areas, confronting Moscow in others. Certainly Washington has used rhetoric that implies Kyiv is wholly responsible for upholding the Minsk II agreements, although this may be entirely for Russian consumption. On the ground, NATO is training Ukrainian forces and the Western European capitals seem disinclined to ignore Crimea’s annexation just to get Russia to adhere to Minsk II. It is hard to say what is going on behind the scenes. Obama has been prepared to lose face diplomatically and to tighten screws very slowly, which is a novel approach for a POTUS, and which has garnered ire from Americans who want decisive action. The takeaway is that Ukraine has been irrevocably divorced from Russia and that the “left-bank vs. right-bank” cycle has been broken by Ukrainian patriotism that had been dormant since the late 1950s.

I read that FP article before, although now I’m faced with a paywall. Aron has oscillated between “Putin has mastery over Obama” and “Putin’s regime is on the verge of collapse”, neither of which I think is true. Both Iran and Russia have lost their key allies for all intents and purposes and have been forced to burn through resources to preserve their geopolitical position, even as they suffer from economic and financial woes. As with Ukraine, the “cessation of hostilities” in Syria was never going to be full and fair, but it has bought the FSA necessary time and re-focused the war on Daesh and Nusra. Again like in Ukraine, a major pro-Assad violation would likely be met with a flood of GCC weapons by way of Turkey and Jordan.

According to the US government, it took years to determine if Russia’s unnamed cruise missile (forgive my earlier R-500 reference which has been refuted) was in fact capable of violating the range limits set by INF and if that cruise missile was in fact designed to be ground-launched. Given the lack of information, I would speculate that Russia has a GLCM that it is developing in order to keep pace with Chinese developments, but which is not yet complete or in production.

I don’t think Obama has any misconceptions about Putin; in fact, he has taken a firmer line than Bush, Jr. The JCPOA makes Iran more dependent upon contact with the wider world and unclenches the anti-American “resistance state” fist of Teheran. Of course, Iranian activities must be closely monitored, but outside of official scrutiny, we can be assured that the Israelis and Arabs are watching closely as well. I don’t see any evidence that Kyiv or the moderate/secular rebels of Syria have been thrown under the bus to further other American interests; I simply think that American interest is limited.