Once again take fact, blend with hyperbole, and distort the truth.Experience in both Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrates that the issue is much more complicated. Specifically, it is undisputed that insurgents have caused vastly more civilian deaths than have COIN forces – air or ground - yet support for the insurgency remains robust in many areas. Put another way, COIN forces rarely enjoy any “propaganda victory” with host-nation populations when the enemy kills innocent people. Thus, the impact of civilian casualties is an issue clearly more complex than simplistic assumptions that underlay the airpower-hostile policies FM 3-24 recommends (and ISAF appears to have adopted).
OIF--I have seen no stats either way. That said, it would require a bracket around the specific time period in question and substantial documentation to make this assertion reasonable.
OEF--Here is the hyperbole and distortion. The issue in OEF is very much in dispute and in fact a number of studies have shown that civilian casualties caused by coalition air strikes have been higher than Taliban suicide bombing,
Overall, this is blog entry is exhibit A in providing a clear view on how far airpower advocates are willing to spin reality. The real issue is NOT airpower. It is NOT a dark conspiracy to undermine roles and missions of the USAF. It is the issue of how one proceeds in COIN. Clearly, General Dunlap does not accept the idea that COIN centers on the population and that the most effective weapons do not shoot. What he goes back towards in this piece is loaded up front in the argument that 7,000 out of 10.000 insurgents in Malaysia were killed. He misses the point that something--some policy, some initiative, some idea--limited that insurgency's ability to self-sustain. Part of it was population control. Most of it was political as in reinforcing the political viability of the government. Finally I would say that his centering on what airpower is singled out for cautionary notes in 3-24 is disingenous. Airpower advocates have for decades argued that aerial delivered weapons were more devastating than ground weapons. But in his concerns over 3-24, the General is suddenly discussing small warms over a one-year period or complaining that an ISAF spokesman does not understand the difference between a 500 pound bomb and a 2000 pound bomb. He msses the point that inside the kill radius the difference is irrelevant. The kill radius for a small arms round is point of impact. As for artillery and mortars, we are not firing much of either and in any case, none has the kill radius or either a 500 pound bomb or a 2000 pond bomb.
A shame, really.
Tom
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