JD

I used to teach this war at Leavenworth with Dr. George Gawrych. There are levels of understanding as you survey the literature and you have to compare works. The Arabs and the Israelis I taught enjoyed the course ---great debates, noo fist fights--because it exposed them to a variety of works they had not seen.

As for Sadat, he had many goals but the strategic was proving that Egypt was a credible threat and that permanent occupation of Sinai was not possible. Shazli's book is probably the best on this but there is much myth attached and embedded in it.

Syrian goals were similar, targeted toward the Golan, but I believe more radical had they succeeded in breaking through. And they nearly did, as my Isareli students echoed.


Look at Geeorge Gawrych's Leavenworth Paper #21

Here is an intro:
SYNOPSIS OF LEAVENWORTH PAPER 21
Armies appear to learn more form defeat than victory. In this regard, armed forces that win quickly, decisively, and with relative ease face a unique challenge in attempting to learn from victory. The Israel Defense Forces certainly fell into this category after their dramatic victory over the combined armies of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in the Six Day War of June 1967.
This study analyzes the problems that beset Israel in the aftermath of its decisive victory in the Six Day War over the Arabs. In the 1973 War, Anwar Sadat, Egypt’s president, was able to exploit Israeli vulnerabilities to achieve political success through a limited war. An important lesson emerges from this conflict. A weaker adversary can match his strengths against the weaknesses of a superior foe in a conventional conflict to attain superior success. Such a strategic triumph for the weaker adversary can occur despite serious difficulties in operational and tactical performance.
The author suggests a striking parallel between the military triumphs of Israel in 1967 and the United States in 1991. In both cases, success led to high expectations. The public and the armed forces came to expect a quick and decisive victory with few casualties. In this environment, a politically astute opponent can exploit military vulnerabilities to his strategic advantage. Sadat offers a compelling example of how this can be done.
From there broaden out using the bibligrpahy in the LP.

Best

Tom