...there are several points that observers of this operation need to consider:
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Prior operations and the changing security problem: The operation comes after a major sweep of al Qa'ida and insurgent cells in Baghdad and the country. It builds on previous success. At the same time, the "red" or dangerous areas in Baghdad have crept back to at least the size they were in early 2005. Senior Iraqi officials make it clear that they also see the threat as both insurgent and a mix of militias and local security forces.
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The problem of force ratios: ...Regardless of the numbers, even 80,000 men would be a small force in terms of the total population and area to be covered....for an operation to have real meaning, and produce sustainable results, it has to go far beyond manning check points, establishing a visible presence, and creating the image of security. These are politically important, but they also will be hollow if they are the core of the operations. Insurgents and militias can simply wait out the operations, bury their arms, shift to targets in other areas, and operate around and outside the checkpoints and areas where forces are present.
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What does matter -- Focused operations: ...the real impact will consist of active operations in the "red" or high threat areas that directly attack insurgent targets on which there is good intelligence, and efforts to disarm, disperse, or directly control the militias.
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Credibility and restraint: The public side of the operation needs to do as much as possible to restore Iraqi faith in US operations, the MOI forces, and the police.
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Phasing the operation and dealing with the militias: ...Prime Minister Maliki has been very clear about the need to bring militias under control, and their has been some discussion of relocating some elements, giving them jobs, disarming them, etc. They cannot be treated in the same way as the
insurgents, but they must be dealt with. Moreover, the clear litmus test is Sadr City and the Mahdi militia. Any operation that does not deal with this problem cannot bring security or stability to Baghdad.
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Follow-up and persistence: ...No matter how successful this operation appears to be, or is claimed to be, it will only have meaning if Iraqi police and the Iraqi government establish a lasting presence and control in red areas.
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The limits to what can be done: ...Victory in Baghdad will always have its limits until there is a much broader defeat of insurgents and a political process that that Arab Shi'ites, Arab Sunnis, Kurds, and others can support. There cannot be a lasting military or security victory in Baghdad without such developments.
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