Rifle squad composition

[jcustis]

First off, I offer this product which has been here with the SWJ for some time now. Its origin is with a former member of 2 Commando, Rhodesian Light Infantry, and is an excellent primer on minor team tactics that were employed by 4-man teams often fighting across dispersed areas.

Drake shooting

Now back to the thread.

The attitude of the commander of the moment -- and, unfortunately, his Boss as well -- will likely be the operating determinant. Good planning can lessen the impact of the small number on force survival.

Ken brings up a very salient point, especially when we start to talk about truf fights and such. Take for example this bit from a May, 2006 article in the Marine Times recounting actions of an experimental DO platoon:

"However, DeSantis did point out that his ability to operate in a more "distributed" manner was hampered by higher commanders in Afghanistan who were loath to separate units into groups smaller than a platoon after a four-man SEAL team was compromised last June.

[Throughout our deployment, we ran against our willingness to be employed in distributed operations like we wanted to, with the higher-level commanders being risk-averse,] DeSantis said."

Being risk-averse certainly runs counter to having any ability to seize the day and prosecute the fight well, but I catch myself wondering what truly defines such aversion.

I've worked within a TF COC/TOC, and while slaving away to meet HHQ information requirements, I came to the conclusion that if headquarters didn't have an established and reliable way to talk to us, they might not care much unless we were forceably displaced from our position. I lean back on my knowledge of the LRDG and SAS in N. Africa when making this statement, because those guys were definitely DO operators, and there are very few reports of the Brit high command becoming all too concerned when a patrol couldn't establish communications over its wireless set during a comm window.

Can force structure at the tactical level be associated with risk-averse mindsets, and can those mindsets in turn be associated with our appetite for real-time information about our forces; an appetite that becomes greater with every leap in C2 capability?