Quote Originally Posted by Rob Thornton View Post
I think what is important is the way we think about the problem - using the analysis of the problem and its conditions to shape the solution vs. trying to use existing solutions against a problem for which they were not designed to anticipate.
The danger here is that we presume that there is a broad, possibly new but nonetheless enduring, problem--whether its CT or stability/PKO ops, or COIN.

I'm not so sure that there is. Not that there aren't new challenges--obviously there are, as 9/11 highlighted--but different parts of the CT (or PKO or whatever) puzzle require very different approaches, approaches that vary over time and space and political context. Quite apart from the dangers of going through major organizational bureaucratic change, there's the risk of designing new structures for problem sets that are themselves constantly evolving and mutating.

All of which leads me to want to look at this very much from the bottom up: what is being done now, or is needed now, that current doctrine, capabilities, or structures don't address? (Related to that--do we really agree what what's lacking now, against current or foreseeable future challenges?)