Counterinsurgency For U.S. Government Policymakers

[Norfolk]

You know - somehow we need to make this happen while getting somebodyelse to pay for it. Hmmm - my vote is JFCOM pays for it and hosts it - we have a broad Joint, Inter-Agency and even multi-national cast - we could allow them to get their agenda out as well - without falling victim to "The Man" and losing our independence / credibility - they benefit in a one time shot that hosts a cross cutting / inter-discipline divers bunch that provides the community a chance to discuss and work through small wars issues and thoughts - which in turn generates greater long term returns because there is no substitute for face to face discussion to strengthen the online type.

What say JFCOM - got a few grand laying around - you could even have the SWC do a sim - of course after we drink your beer, we're back to being ourselves.

Best, Rob

Given the number of Canadians on this board, a layout of a little more than a few $k may be rather prudent, unless of course the rest are taking up teetotalling for the duration of the "sim", with all the attendent negative consequences for Joint and Multi-National Operations that would entail.

kehenry1 - Quote:

I believe that's why I stated in an earlier post that the question of which takes precedence is sometimes related to the person's experience. Combat oriented may focus on the combat while "state" oriented may focus on the non-kinetic, political aspects. Thus, someone has to be able to balance them and figure out when the right time to apply either/or/both is.

...may be true and may also be trying to communicate in the simplest, most recognizable terms. A US infantry man with his "political" experience in the states, probably doesn't associate "politics" with physical violence. Thus, it is meant to translate based on his experiences.

-Unquote

Excellent point kehenry, although I would refine that statement to say that one's experience of politics simply translates so, rather than is intended to translate so. As such, it's no wonder that a US infantry man whose experience of politics back home involves little to no violence, let alone war, is left perhaps a little befuddled when politics is very much entwined with both violence and war in such places as the Near East.

But going back even within living memory, a British Army officer might not have suffered the same confusion. During the days of the Empire, and even for some time afterwards, an officer was quite aware that his role was not simply that of a military leader, but as an agent of his Government's policies; his conduct was directed towards that end, and if that end required military means to achieve, he was well-positioned to see to it. In effect, the Imperial officer was a sort of minor legate, and an Imperial general officer a sort of proconsul. In any case, the role of the officer, though uniquely military, was inherently and above all political in nature, and his duties conducted in that light.

Clausewitz was quite correct in tying politics and war directly together, and if we take the simple (simple to state at least) definition of politics as how people relate to each other, then war, as a possible condition of those relations, is not only inherently political in its ultimate objective, but so are its actors, even the lowly infantryman. As far as that goes, Lt. Col. Gentile is likewise correct when he objects to the absence of Clausewitz as a reference in COIN Doctrine.

Where I would disagree with Col. Gentile, and very much agree with Ken and marc, is making a hard distinction between war on the one hand, and COIN on the other. COIN is inherently political, as is war, and both require soldiers to wage it, who are themselves inescapably political actors. Likewise, the insurgents have a political objective in mind, and act as such. That is not to say that all aspects of COIN are necessarily about war or even military operations; most certainly not. In many COIN campaigns, police and other civil and paramilitary security forces have often borne the brunt of the COIN fight; similarly, not all insurgent acts of violence are necessarily acts of war or even military in nature, such as rioting, sabotage and subversion, assassination, terrorism, etc.

But when extremists elements surpass such acts and move on to the occupation of territories and military control of populations, engage in guerrilla/partisan operations, and even wage the odd pitched battle now and then, they have clearly crossed over the ambiguous line that separates extremist violence from low-intensity war. It is no longer just crimes committed with political ends in mind. COIN, therefore, is war, even if it involves much more than just military operations.

And so, all that said, it's vital to have a definition of what "politics" means that is comprehensive yet practical; but it will also require a definition of "war" that meets the same standard. Clausewitz, of course, defined war as the conduct of politics by other means. While it's basically correct, it requires some qualification and explanation to be comprehensive, yet practical.