"Probably" is an estimate. It's not a certainty. We know what we know, and we don't know what we don't know. We estimate and arrive at key judgements on the rest.
Still I think Assessment B is very much overlooked. Particularly with respect to North Korean activities through October 2006:
As stated in this NIE Scope Note:
The above speaks direct to the 3000 centrifuges producing HEU.This NIE does not assume that Iran intends to acquire nuclear weapons. Rather, it examines the intelligence to assess Iran’s capability and intent (or lack thereof) to acquire nuclear weapons, taking full account of Iran’s dual-use uranium fuel cycle and those nuclear activities that are at least partly civil in nature.
And in Assessment B we read:
The above speaks directly to either or both North Korea and the AQ Khan network of nuclear weapons technology proliferation.We cannot rule out that Iran has acquired from abroad—or will acquire in the future—a nuclear weapon or enough fissile material for a weapon.
Someone will have to take the WSJ and WeeklyStandard to task on thier reporting. Nevertheless Tom Fingar's statement (assessment?) on July 11, 2007 on Iranian nuclear weapons was:Tom Fingar is an old Army MI guy, and a fellow linguist. I doubt that he permitted his personal political beliefs to contaminate his analysis -
The man said what he said just five months prior to this NIE."Iran and North Korea are the states of most concern to us. The United States’ concerns about Iran are shared by many nations, including many of Iran’s neighbors. Iran is continuing to pursue uranium enrichment and has shown more interest in protracting negotiations and working to delay and diminish the impact of UNSC sanctions than in reaching an acceptable diplomatic solution. We assess that Tehran is determined to develop nuclear weapons--despite its international obligations and international pressure. This is a grave concern to the other countries in the region whose security would be threatened should Iranacquire nuclear weapons."
Bookmarks