Not me. Let me cut and paste from an unpublished manuscript I've been toying with.Originally Posted by Global Scout
THE FRAGILE ASSUMPTIONS OF AMERICAN STRATEGY
The core assumptions of American strategy were born under duress. Unlike the Cold War when Americans had the luxury of extended debate about appropriate response to Soviet aggression, September 11 demanded immediate action. The United States had to act quickly based only on what was known and anticipated at the time. In this pressure-packed and chaotic environment, President Bush and his key advisers developed the fundamental assumptions for what became known as the “war on terror” during the weeks after the attack. In the years that followed, there was little opportunity for deep debate about them. The atmosphere of crisis precluded it: to question the basic assumptions of the strategy was to be unpatriotic. When President Bush used his now-famous phrase "you are with us or against us" he was talking to the leaders of other states, but the idea applied just as much to the American public and Congress. This is understandable given the conditions and passions of the time. But we now have the opportunity for a sober and rigorous re-evaluation of the fundamental assumptions of American strategy. We better understand the threat and have greater psychological distance from the trauma of September 11. We also have a better sense of what has worked (and what has not) in the dangerous world of the 21st century.
On first hearing, the core assumptions of the war on terror make perfect sense—or at least they did in the immediate aftermath of September 11. With more careful scrutiny, they seem fragile at best, counterproductive, perhaps even wrong. Some of the assumptions can (and should) be revised, others jettisoned all together. A failure to do this—to continue with fragile or erroneous assumptions—could lead to ineffectiveness, isolation, even danger. Serious reflection is not only possible, it is imperative.
We Are at War
Take, for starters, the assumption that the United States is at war. There is no doubt that September 11 required bold action. But it did not have to be a “war” on terrorists of global reach. Casting it as such was a vital decision. As Walter Russell Mead writes, “Historians are likely to agree that nothing in the record of the Bush administration is as significant as its decision to describe the struggle that began on September 11 as a—or rather, the—“war on terror.” It set the United States on a strategic trajectory that continues today.
Certainly al Qaeda itself claimed to be at war with the United States, but so too have a range of motley groups, bands, and organizations, throughout history. This alone did not make it inevitable that the United States approach the conflict as war. For a war to exist, both sides have to agree that it does. And "all terrorists of global reach" certainly did not consider themselves at war with the United States. Ultimately the decision to cast the conflict as war probably had more to do with politics—with symbolism--than with an assessment that declaring war was the most effective approach to the threat. It demonstrated the seriousness with which the United States took the challenge from terrorism. And, quite frankly, leading the nation in war is more appealing, more glorious than leading it in a sustained, irregular conflict or—heaven forbid—imperial maintenance or transnational law enforcement. More broadly, portraying the conflict as war gave the Bush administration “operating space” both internationally and domestically, allowing it to undertake actions that it never could during peacetime. Other nations initially muted reservations they might have had about American actions. Domestic opposition and partisanship was dampened (at least until the extent of the fiasco in Iraq became clear). There is, after all, a powerful tendency to “rally ‘round the flag” in times of war. But do the benefits of portraying the conflict with violent Islamic extremists as war outweigh the disadvantages, limitations, and adverse second-order effects?
Perhaps not. To take one example, portraying the conflict as war created an expectation that there would be demonstrable progress and, ultimately, victory. America wins its wars. Despite the efforts of the President and his advisers to warn the public that this conflict could last for decades (sometimes with little progress), two hundred years of American history said otherwise. History told Americans that war is abnormal and episodic. It has a beginning and end. In the early stages the United States might experience setbacks, but eventually the momentum shifts and America marches inexorably toward defeat of the enemy. This is what war looks like to Americans. But the conflict with Islamic militants has now followed this pattern. This has created frustration and an erosion of support for President Bush. Despite the Administration’s effort to explain to the public that "this" war was different than all past American wars, they never convinced all of the public. The idea persisted that if, in fact, “this” war is not like any previous war, then perhaps it is not a war at all.
Portraying the conflict as war had other results and implications as well. For instance, it diminished the importance of other security issues and the protection of legal rights. Again, this reflects the American tradition. When the nation is at war, other security concerns are shoved to the background. Legal rights are temporarily constricted with the idea that they will be restored later. That all made perfect sense when America's wars lasted a few years. During the Civil War, securing the frontier or dealing with the French excursion in Mexico could wait. Lincoln's suspension of habeas corpus was tolerable because it was temporary. Similar things happened in the world wars. The Cold War, though, was a bit different, largely because of its length. The idea that all security issues were judged by their relationship to the core superpower struggle did have some adverse effects. It alienated many states in the non-aligned movement which were frustrated by Washington's insistence on judging them and their concerns through the prism of the Cold War. Some of these relationships were later repaired, others were not. Ultimately, though, this did not destroy the effectiveness of American strategy. The superpower competition was, in fact, relevant to regional security almost everywhere. Security partnerships, issues, and problems moved to the background by America's focus on the superpower conflict actually were of secondary importance—at least at the time.
Our insistence on prioritizing security issues based on how they affected the superpower balance set the stage for some disastrous conflicts during the post-Cold War period. Had the United States approached Yugoslavia, Zaire, Afghanistan, Iraq, Cuba, Algeria, South Africa, Central America, Somalia, and North Korea without considering their relationship to the Cold War, we might not have lost interest after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Eventually things might have turned out differently. But history aside, are we making the same mistake today? Now the war on terror determines U.S. interest in a given country, region, issue, or conflict. As during the Cold War, some states overemphasize the potential for terrorism within their borders or their region, knowing that is the only way to sustain American interest and support. Are we paying inadequate attention to security problems with little or no connection to Islamic extremism such as social strife in Latin America, ecological decay, trade imbalances, immigration, domestic extremism, and technology proliferation? And are we cultivating security partners based strictly on their role in countering Islamic extremism even though this relationship may eventually come back to haunt us?
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