I've stated my preference for the 13 man USMC squad, it is totally flexible and provides adequate power for almost every conceivable mission. The USMC organization also puts the crew served stuff at Co level where, as Norfolk says, it is best trained and controlled. It doesn't need a lot of tinkering.

Army squads can and do use fire and maneuver (as most understand that term) and are capable of independent operations -- and squads DO get (and should get) independent missions. The only time they don't is when a lack of leadership capability above their level gets on a "force protection" kick and is lacking in the testicular fortitude to trust 'em and let them do their jobs. Admittedly, that happens entirely too often nowadays...

Even with the smaller Army unit size, you effectively get six four man recon (or whatever) teams and while I'd rather see the MG and Javelins * at Co level, the Weapons squad concept does work and does have the advantage of forcing the PSG and PL to think of weapons and support on a constant as opposed to an as required basis.

( * The Javelin is a good if heavy weapon; its predecessor, the Dragon, was an unmitigated -- and unsalvageable -- disaster and didn't die soon enough.)

Still, having been in both in conventional and COIN ops for real as well as in peacetime, stateside training -- the Marines have it right. The Army model will work and I have no doubt a competent Pl and PSG in either can do anything I've seen suggested in this and the related threads.

Either model can be reorganized internally and for specific missions as the Platoon Leader and Platoon Sergeant decide; at least in my experience, they don't have to ask anybody. That said with the caveat that at the beginning of a war, some senior NCOs and Officers can be unduly hidebound -- but that is their problem and those types aren't likely to get to close to the booms, bees and snap of combat and can generally be politely and discretely ignored.

At the rifle Company level, bigger is better. There are a lot of force multipliers out there but at the level of the Infantry company, most are not terribly helpful; adequate strength to deal with human frailty, combat losses and other attritional factors is imperative. The Marines understand that; they also understand the "If it ain't broke, don't fix it" rule...

The factor many miss at that level when they start with the reorganizing what-ifs is the training value of Teams and Squads. Many theorists operate on the fallacy that every one in the Platoon (or any other level) is well or at least adequately trained in his job. They aren't and never will be; humans fail, need leave, dozens of factors -- there are ALWAYS new people coming in and, particularly in war time, they will never be fully trained and competent -- particularly at combat troop leading. That's why the civilian penchant for "flattening the pyramid" does not work for combat organizations (not to mention that it doesn't work all that well in civilian industry, either ). Being a Team leader is the elementary school, Squad leader is Middle School and the PSG is the High School -- none of them need a degree, much less an advanced degree but..

Don't go to war without them.