Battle Drill

[Fred III]

Norfolk—

Thank you, as well. I wasn’t aware you were in one of the Commonwealth armies, so your points about this whole discussion are particularly interesting to me. Unfortunately, I am not well versed in either the tactics of “British-born” armies (and I use that term only in the way of Genesis) or current-day American thinking. Obviously, much of what I have to say comes from experience of a long time ago, plus the good fortune of having served under some extremely fine examples of American leadership. I guess I can drop some names with the best of them!

I am in complete agreement with you and Ken White regarding “battle drill” vis-à-vis leadership and I think this is where some people may get tripped up. Nothing works without good leadership to ensure the theories are properly instituted and carried out and I wonder if that is more the problem than the specifics of the drill. As you can imagine, I am particularly sensitive to the areas of military convoys, patrolling, and platoon drill, and whenever I see or hear about these situations in places like Iraq and Afghanistan my ire is drawn to our leadership. I am not fond of contracting out what I consider military operations and I am even less happy about seeing the greatly expanded role of women in the military. To me, contractors should spend their time building facilities the military is not traditionally equipped to handle and that fall more in line with civilian expertise, i.e., port facilities, permanent structures, etc., not convoy driving, not running mess halls, not dishing out supplies; and women should be doing the clerical, the nursing, the doctoring, and more of the administrative duties than humping tires on 5-ton vehicles or trying to out-run a bunch of Iraqis dying of laughter. That doesn’t work, I’ll tell you. My cynicism tells me precisely why these two situations exist, but the horror—to me—is that the individual soldier—and that includes the women who serve—are the ones who pay the price. That ain’t “battle drill,” but it is a matter of leadership and it extends to well beyond the military. What makes it particularly galling is that by now the military leadership is complicit. It’s like the old arguments for and against the volunteer army: you had to drag the generals, kicking and screaming, into it, and now you would have to drag them kicking and screaming out of it. Today, they’d probably get a medal from the politicians just for a public “thumbs-up.” Re-sew the lettuce, boys! And that pink-and-purple one on the far left is for….

The problem with DePuy’s battle drill is that I am not sure it was ever fully accepted or implemented into doctrine. That’s more an I-don’t-know, however, than a statement of fact. One might think as head of TRADOC, he would pretty much get his way, especially with something as menial as platoon-sized drill, but I don’t know. I am very surprised, however, that there is not more discussion of his ideas and methods, especially when I see the quality of person on these boards. That almost leads me to believe he has been superseded by… not the skirmish line, I hope!

His drill worked—at least in theory—and I know his “traveling” formations worked in practice—and in combat. But again, it must always be remembered, there was more than just the “A Team moves; B Team fires,” etc. Cover and concealment were integral parts of the drill, as was reliance on higher assets. The deal was to sow confusion and uncertainty and I’m not sure there is anyone unwilling to accept those principles when it comes to warfare, however small the engagement or units involved.

Another thing about William DePuy that I believe a lot of people are unaware of. The American army has this penchant for attrition warfare. It started with U. S. Grant when Lincoln tapped him for command and it hasn’t changed a whole hell of lot since. What’s so intriguing about DePuy’s strategy, however, is his reversal of the theory. Grant employed his “attritive” tactics sort of like a battering ram. He just kept throwing assets at Lee until he wore the Southern forces out. That has been our way ever since and we’ve been blessed with the ability to do just that (of course, there’s the human element that might not agree too readily about flinging fathers and sons into the cauldron!). In Vietnam, DePuy turned the tables and I don’t really know if he’s been given credit for what he attempted to do. The press grabs a hold of this stuff and screams attrition didn’t work in Vietnam, but with DePuy’s theories—and practices—it was the other guy doing the attrition. Think about that for a moment. Knowing they will keep coming, pound them and pound them and pound them. Make them use their assets. Without the bottomless pit spelled “A-M-E-R-I-C-A,” the NVA would eventually have to fold. Clever, don’t you think?

The problem, however, was that we couldn’t go into their sanctuaries; into Cambodia, into Laos (except for Special Forces); we couldn’t physically control or take out the Ho Chi Minh Trail, so we could never hit them hard enough to force the necessary replacements, thereby draining the swamp. Their “swamp” was always regenerating and so we failed. Military strategy succumbed to civilian vicissitudes. I find distinct parallels with our efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Tora Bora is a partial example, exacerbated by what I see as Tommy Franks’ incompetence. If we had a foray or two into Pakistan, what do you think Musharraf might say besides, “Thanks, boys!” As for the militants… what? Piss them off? Seems like we’ve already done that! This ruse of turning over security and military operations to the Iraqis is another. We did that with the ARVN, remember? That’s the old blame-game again. Who, Moi? You lost the war! This sudden enlightenment with the new counter-insurgency manual also fits the shoe. Did anyone read the Special Forces Warfare School’s manuals and study publications of some 42 years ago? They say smell is the most powerful of the senses. Seems like I’ve smelled that rose before.

Anyway, I am delighted to know there are DePuy adherents here and I really do think this so-called “battle drill”—if properly taught—works. Again, as an officer, I wouldn’t know what to do without it, and I would be interested in seeing what those who think it is all worthless would substitute for training and doctrine.

Best wishes,
Fred.