...who prefers to remain anonymous for some unknown reason. Author does credit the discussion here for some of the thought.

FYI, I got the dreaded SWJ Server Death Grip when I tried to post this yesterday. Fortunately, I can recognize it and know who to call. Need to change our host, and apologies to all the people who aren't reading this now because they can't get through.

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One characteristic of many small wars is that they are asymmetric: one actor possesses considerably more “hard” or military power than the other. Yet many ostensibly weaker powers seem able to negate this advantage through the use of information. Manipulation of existing news outlets (e.g., newspapers and magazines), and creation of new media outlets (e.g., blogs and websites), may permit weaker actors to achieve end states otherwise unattainable. Under what conditions are such information operations most likely to succeed (e.g, during more traditional military operations, such as the November 2004 assault on Fallujah, or during less traditional military operations, such as the pacification of Anbar)? What are the most efficient ways for weaker actors to use information operations to negate their opponents’ military advantages? Conversely, what are the most efficient ways for stronger actors to deny weaker actors such capabilities (e.g., embedding, foreign-language websites, etc.))? Which branch or branches of the US Government are best able to conduct such operations, and in what ways?

The US military has sought to learn counterinsurgency lessons from the experiences of other militaries as well its own. But to some extent, each military is unique. With respect to the US military, to what extent can lessons from other militaries be applied, to what extent are lessons from other militaries inapplicable, and why? What are the dimensions one should assess when importing lessons from other militaries? What makes such lessons applicable or inapplicable – the nature of the US political system (e.g., division of responsibility for prosecution of wars between Congress and the Executive), the nature of the US military (e.g, dissimilar from the British regimental system), the absence of unity of command within a theatre and separate lines of authority between DOD and State, etc.? For example, to what extent should one apply British COIN lessons from Malaya or Kenya, or Russian COIN lessons from Afghanistan, and what rationales dictate which lessons should be applied when (e.g., British lessons should be applied because the British political system is more similar to the US one, or Russian lessons should be applied because it too lacked a small wars tradition)?

The concepts of guerilla war, unconventional war, insurgency, low-intensity conflict, asymmetric conflict, and terrorism – to name a few – overlap to a considerable degree, but also diverge to a similar degree. Not all insurgencies take place within the context of unconventional wars (e.g., actions during the US Revolutionary and Civil Wars), nor do all asymmetric conflicts necessarily involve insurgencies (e.g., the Israel-Lebanon/Hezbollah 2006 war). Accordingly, distinctions between small wars and large wars may be considerably overstated: a war might be characterized as “primarily” “small” or “large,” but nevertheless contain large components of each. To aid to the complexity, militaries – and organizations more generally – can arguably change only slowly and painfully at best, and/or be capable of doing only one thing. Finally, while the United States is currently waging (at a minimum) two counterinsurgencies, the potential of major or large regional conflicts cannot be discounted entirely. Accordingly, to what extent – if at all – should the US military attempt to organize (or reorganize) itself for small wars? Or, conversely, should the US military be content with the progress it has made in drafting FM 3-24, and reorienting itself toward small wars, and decide its change has been sufficient? What tradeoffs, if any, should be made?