Mike Innes said:That coincides with my thoughts. There are good ideas in both papers but IMO, neither really surfaces anything new (unless I missed something, always possible"Personally, I'm skeptical not of the uses of new labels and reconceptualization in general, but of overlabeling and relabeling the issues of now. A lot of the confusion and debate on what is and what isn't "new", I think, is gobbledygook longhand for "what we don't yet understand" and "insufficient historical hindsight to get a grip". In this case, though, I think Hoffman's work is worth considering; so's Bousquet's."), they've just applied new tags while packaging a lot of disparate factors together rather well. Quite well, in fact.
One could've hoped for more illustrative discussion. Ron makes that point pretty well, I think:However, Wilf really sums the issue up rather neatly with this:"If you bring answers to the table without the readers getting an eyefull of what it really means now, in your face then they will generally look at it from a predictive vantage point. And as most humans do they will figure that they are about as good at seeing the future as you are."My sensing is that both nations have a bunch of smart guys, many of whom have already figured out in detail what Hoffman and Bosquet have packaged neatly and named aptly. I think the issue is not that we're too stupid because I don't believe we are; I think the question is more correctly "...are the US/UK forces going to be able to overcome their bureaucratic leanings and risk aversion in order to adapt in a timely manner?""I think we need ask, why we want to describe something in terms terms used. What Frank has held back from saying is that "the US/UK Forces may be too stupid to adapt.""
With that, I'll go ponder Hybrid mixed blended chaoplexic 5.5G warfare while I sip my nightcap...![]()
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