Craig -

One other thing came to mind...something worth talking about at the platoon level: FORCE PROTECTION.

My concern is that some young leaders in today's environment might believe their primary goal is to protect their Soldiers even more than it is to accomplish their mission. ie. I worry that we are placing force protection above mission accomplishment. While they are not mutually exclusive, you cannot always have both.

As an example, and perhaps as a tangent - I worry about the politicization of the MRAP fielding in Iraq. I worry even more about people who implicitly support the "more protection is better" argument. I'm an Armor Officer, and I love the Abrams MBT, but I did everything I could to stay off off tanks in Iraq. When I was almost blown up by a massive IED and my commander tried to get me back on "track," I refused because it would not allow me to do what I needed to do in COIN. I worry about reinforcing a "commute to work" mentality with the MRAP, etc. and wonder whether more (as in Frag Kit 6 & gunner's 'cloches') is really better, or if force protection might become such a concern that it is a detriment to successful COIN Ops.

I think we need to have candid conversations with our junior leaders about how accepting risk, or better - mitigating risk in a deliberate manner, rather than risk-avoidance is the right mentality. Even deeper...the discussion that MAYBE, by taking greater risk now (ie. staying closer to the ground rather than climbing onto MRAP elephants) we might be negating risks to come...

To me (Armor-Cav guy), moving dismounted is A technique with several advantages but also very limited (in speed, distance and support). The MRAP, to me, represents the latest chapter in a vicious cycle of pursuing protection rather than fighting smarter, harder, and LIGHTER. Previous chapters in the protection novel included Frag Kit 6 and gunner's 'cloches' (see Maginot Line for illustration) on M1114s...both responses to an enemy TTP that, in my mind, don't make enough of a difference to justify the drawbacks (weight, obscuration, etc.)

I'm a huge fan of the M1114. But not what I see now. You might as well put the gunner inside with the rest of the crew, or go with the MRAP. But most people seem very satisfied with more armor, more stuff on the cupola, and heck...even a new vehicle altogether...the MRAP. But 1. how many lives will it save? 2. How much will it hamper our agility, ability, and mentality to get at COIN the right way?

I'm still not getting to my point. Let me try it this way...
1. More is not always better! More armor (usually) = more weight = less mobility and less agility. And if it doesn't REALLY mean better protection (if a catastrophic IED is still a catastrophic IED) then it isn't worth the baggage.
2. More protection (often) encourages less thinking. I've personally seen units (leaders) lulled into thinking their C-IED or armor package "protect" them like a magical cloak, thus forgetting about patterns, CREW fratricide, etc. There are some places we MUST go REPEATEDLY and REGULARLY...we need CREW, armor, and deliberate clearance techniques to do that. But we should not adopt that mentality for ALL operations.
3. In the end, we are part of a profession that requires us to be prepared to take casualties. We owe all that we have to protecting our Soldiers and setting them up for success. But we cannot forsake mission accomplishment for protection. Sometimes...SOMETIMES...taking risks, and taking causalities as a result of these risks, means more Soldiers are saved in the long-run due to mission accomplishment. This is the hard-smart-counterintuitive discussion I'm most eager to have with junior leaders. So...instead of providing more protection that allows us to do routine missions and get the most guys back for refit & Cinnabon...we need to be willing to go light, stay out longer, and take reasonable risks that make us more effective. Ironically, if our #1 concern is saving Soldiers lives, I worry that we will lose more Soldiers in the long run...