No comment on Benning. I can say that CMATT was a nightmare, and the use of Institutional Training Army Reserve people was a mistake that set us back 9 to 12 months in Iraq. As far as MG Batiste, my issue is he really won't come out and say who was putting pressure on him not to ask for more forces, or who was denying him forces, my guess is that it was at the level below SecDef. When 1st ID RIP/TOA'd with 4th ID, 4ID units were directd to conduct Right Seat/Left Seat rides of the unit AO's down to the squad/section level. Usually the Army only does this at the company and above level. The 1st ID guys really didn't have good situational awareness of what was going on on the ground. They pretty much said "we have been in and out of the Balkan's for ten years and we received the power point briefing". I have to question the climate in a unit that would allow that subordinate units to be so cavalier going into the Tikrit area. as far as COL Hammes, I think he has a really good grasp of Maoist insurgency and how it is evoiving in the information age. My concern with COL Hammes book, is that it is at best a book on insurgency and counter-insurgency in the information age. My concern is that many people are taking Hammes' work is a definitive answer to the war we are fighting, I don't think that it is a definitive work, and I do not think that Hammes would argue that his book is the definitive work for GWOT. Just my $.02 cents which is suffering from poor exchange rates.