Sorry for the late reply - work and power outages prevented me from answering sooner.

RTK - I defer to you on Sassaman's character. As I mentioned, I have no basis for assessment. However, you said:

Sassaman's character, displayed during a time of duress, allows me to discredit or take with skepticism anything he says. Perhaps your moral compass allows you differently, but when someone proves to me they are ethically bankrupt, it tends to contaminate all future interactions.
Despite your continued questioning of my moral compass (and though I appreciate your concern, you don't need to worry about my sense of morality - I'll take care of that on my own), history (including American history) is full of unsavory characters who have nevertheless contributed tremendously to our understanding of certain issues. You may argue that Sassaman is saying nothing new, which is fine, but what he writes about here is not discredited b/c of any character issues he might have - at least not in my book.

But as for your argument that it's nothing new, maybe not - yet we continue to waste our time and resources playing around with terminology thinking that it's all of a sudden going to matter in winning over non-extremist Muslims to our side compared to our efforts on the ground. And Ken White - regarding your questions on the use of indigenous forces (I hope a long post doesn't get me in trouble again):
Does this mean that you believe indigenous forces are not necessary?
Not at all - there is no doubt that using indigenous forces can be hugely advantageous in counterinsurgency. In our successful counterinsurgencies, for example Philippines, we used local forces to our benefit. The key difference, however, was that we didn’t dedicate huge amounts of resources to organize and train the force we wanted in the long term in order to handle the short-term fight. Instead, we used the indigenous forces that were available to use, such as the Macabebe and Ilocano scouts, and we built up sophisticated intelligence networks using money and other incentives based on the thinking (correctly, I believe) that the local populations would prefer security and essential services more than a warm, fuzzy feeling from having their own forces fighting (even if they were unable to provide that security). The value of efficacy really should not be underestimated. Our previous counterinsurgency strategy focused heavily on training LSF to fight the insurgents ("as the Iraqis stand up, we'll stand down"), and for all the good of the new doctrine, I would argue that it continues to place too much emphasis on fighting the insurgency through LSF.

In FM 3-24, there is an entire chapter dedicated to organizing and training LSF. Section 6-1 argues, “Success in counterinsurgency operations requires establishing a legitimate government supported by the people and able to address the fundamental causes that insurgents use to gain support. Achieving these goals requires the host nation to defeat insurgents or render them irrelevant, uphold the rule of law and provide a basic level of essential services and security for the populace. Key to all these tasks is developing an effective host-nation security force.”

Later, it goes on to say: “U.S. combat operations are secondary to enabling the host nation’s ability to provide for its own security.” Nowhere in the chapter on training host nation forces does it explain the rationale behind these statements. Of course, this is doctrine, so it's about action, not theoretical navel-gazing, but before we dedicate a large number of the best and brightest of our counterinsurgents (“Commanders must assign the best qualified Soldiers and Marines to training and advisory missions.”) to training LSF and take their focus, even if just partially, off of defeating or rendering insurgents irrelevant, more focus paid to the "why" wouldn’t hurt.

The field manual argues that three things have to be done to achieve success at counterinsurgency: defeat insurgents or render them irrelevant, uphold the rule of law, and provide a basic level of essential services and security for the populace. No explanation is given, however, as to how a recently trained force is supposed to take on more and more of these responsibilities over time….and succeed. In the meantime, the US is devoting such a large number of valuable resources to create these forces out of nothing because it supposedly brings “legitimacy.” As the American military has proven in the past, providing the people with security, services and a fair legal system – and taking carefully thought out actions to show that we had no imperial designs on their land - brings a great deal of its own legitimacy. Meanwhile, an indigenous government – even one democratically elected – that is, at least in part, corrupt, ineffective and made up of groups trying to kill each other, will likely squander any legitimacy it might have received simply from being indigenous. (This reminds me of the assumption made during the post WWI and post World War II decolonization eras that indigenous rule automatically meant democratic or legitimate rule.)

I also think when you dedicate the resources (both in quality and quantity) that are devoted to training LSF, you leave these forces somewhat more open to attack by the insurgency than if they had been out in constant patrols, living in the towns they were protecting, gaining intelligence, gauging insurgent activity and readying themselves for fighting. (Assigning them to train and advise missions, additionally, takes away from the number of troops actively focused exclusively on the insurgency). As a result, it is at least somewhat easier for insurgents to carry out the attacks that are so spectacular, that in the era of 24-hour news, a low casualty rate, in the end, is irrelevant. Regardless of what the reality is, these attacks give the impression that the US is losing. This makes the American public all the more opposed to our continued presence, and the issue gets thrown into the political arena. Even the politicians that had previously supported the war begin to turn, be it out of principle or political expediency. The historical record suggests that withdrawal of forces will soon follow. The result, historically, has been to declare the LSF adequately trained, and turn over control of the counterinsurgency, no matter what the reality may be. This course of events has always ended poorly – both for the host nation and for the US, which more often than not would, before long, find itself back in the country. Section 6-59 of FM 3-24 states that the US should train to standards, not to time. Unfortunately, given the political reality that usually arises at home, the historical record suggests that this might be easier said than done.