We need to be careful when comparing one small war with another. While there's a temptation to compare the US experience in Vietnam to Iraq, or any other small war, there are significant differences that must be considered before drawing any conclusions.

While I would agree that one difference between North Vietnam and the US was a difference of will (we fought a much more limited war), we also need to ask ourselves whether or not our strategy was in line with our strategic goals and whether or not our strategy suited the threat. Keep in mind that our experience in Vietnam was reactive, not proactive. We fought a counterguerrilla war because the enemy chose to fight a guerrilla war, for good reasons. We made little to no effort to change the nature of the war to suit us, and accepted, by default, war on the enemy’s terms.

To state that Vietnam, Somalia, and Iraq, “underscore the limits of U.S. conventional military superiority,” is incorrect. American military superiority is understood and accepted by many of our enemies. While Vietnam was fighting the US it chose to fight a guerrilla war, but remember that in the end they won via a conventional invasion of the south. Even in Iraq (2003) the main part of Iraqi resistance was not based on their conventional forces, as in Desert Storm, but on the use of unconventional Fedayeen (sp?) supported by miscellaneous Iraqi army units using guerrilla tactics. Both Vietnam and Iraq recognized “U.S. conventional military superiority” and chose guerrilla tactics, and prolonged warfare, as their strategy.

I would say that our failure is not with our military capabilities, but with our military and political strategies, and that one size does not fit all. Iraq and Vietnam were two different wars. Just one factor to consider is that of outside support. North Vietnam enjoyed the support of China and the Soviet Union and enjoyed the safety of protected bases (N. Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia) from which to launch their operations. Insurgents in Iraq do not enjoy that type of open support; their's is more subtle and based far more on the ethnic and religious divides of Iraqi society, which are related to outside Arab and Persian factions, than existed in Vietnam.

Two different wars and two different strategies are required. While “will” is always an important factor, what’s more important is developing a strategy that is in alignment with your goals given existing constraints (the reality on the ground). I believe the problem in Iraq is not, at root, one of “will” but one of a failure of U.S. strategy. Our strategy focused on Phase III operations without consideration of how we would transition into Phase IV; our means were not aligned with our goals.

Having said that -- as our strategic failure becomes more obvious, and therefore we perceive a lack of progress, “will” becomes more of a factor. We want to see success; we want to see forward motion – without it we begin to doubt why we’re there, which leads to a lack of will. My bigger concern is that whereas our previous strategic goal was to create a secure democratic state in Iraq, a goat for which we did not provide adequate resources, it appears our new political goal is merely to “not lose.” Hmmmm…..