Information Operations

[Randy Brown]

According to JP 3-13, Information Operations, the term is defined as “the integrated employment of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own.”

Randy, I don't disagree with what you wrote above, actually I agree strongly with much of it; however, the entire point of this thread was to address the confusing definition of IO (first post).

I would argue what your writing about falls under the Army's definition of:

Influence Operations: to effect the behavior of the intended audience through coercion, information engagement, presence and conduct.

AND

Information Engagement: the government's use of integrated employment of public information programs, psychological operations, and support leader and government activities (reparing a school, security force behavior) to influence a target audience.

Roger! My apologies if you thought that I was shooting outside the barber poles. I agree that the definitions of Influence Operations and Information Engagement do encompass much of what I'm wrestling with in this thread. However, I thought I was aiming a little closer to center-mass, IO definition-wise, in that I would be loathe to divorce the tech-stuff (EW, CNO, the hardware side of PSYOP) from the soft-power stuff. I still think it's germaine; please indulge me a few more sentences to apply SPORTS and get my sight picture again ... (Further apologies for beating my semi-amusing range-fire metaphor to an early death this morning.)

Caveats: the usual U.S. "better-fighting-through-better-technology" bias is definitely at play here, and the fact that I'm a commo guy working in an intel slot (so I gots to have my tech-toys).

Schmedlap: Thanks for your notes regarding "working groups." I'd started to get into the "ad hoc" part in yesterday's rambles, and now wish that I had. I agree that we're in agreement: the interaction and de-confliction regarding IO is best done on a case-by-case, mission-by-mission basis. In the civilian world, I'd even use "virtual team" as another way to say "working group," given that the experts might be geograpically dispersed on the battlefield.

As with Bill's notes regarding "Influence Operations" and "Information Engagement," I am also mentally juggling your points on "Information Superiority." Because the term seems to invite comparison to "Air Superiority" (the subject of some other fun conversations on this site, by the way), I wonder whether this is a way to resolve my apparent need to incorporate the tech-side, as above, AND to address William F. Owen's position that:

IF (the control of information content and flow across/among BLUFOR, enemy, and population) is the goal, then it is unattainable. It's like "all-weather" and "information dominance." The idea that anyone or anything can "control" information in the Information Age is both illusory and highly damaging.

I agree that information cannot be controlled, but it can and should be shaped to meet battlefield objectives. Taking a page from my engineer buddies, information viewed in obstacle terms can be "fixed, disrupted, turned or blocked."

Information Operations, as defined by JP 3-13, allows for a doctrinal sum greater than its parts. (Granted, unpacking the definition will keep us busy for years--just look at this thread.) For example, when a brigade commander has to weigh whether or not to alienate the civilian population by shaping the local frequency spectrum (perhaps "IO Air Superiority" is "Airwave Superiority"?), it's not ...

... just "messaging." (Because there is a physical-space component.)

... just "collection" or "targeting." (Because it, if nothing else, creates a secondary observer effect on the battlefield.)

... just "electronic warfare." (Because it involves implicit and indirect messages--what do the locals think when the proverbial dial-tone goes dead? What do the bad guys think? How do both populations react?)

I think it's ... "Information Operations." And, short-story-long, I think that means I'm in agreement with the JP 3-13 definition.

(Side note to Schmedlap: The last paragraph is the best way to-date that I've been able to generically articulate a concrete example of how/why I see Public Affairs, Civil Affairs, and PSYOP implications stemming from non-lethal effects targeting.)

(Additional note: I posted before seeing this reminder regarding pros-and-cons of Taliban operations against civilian cellular telephone infrastructure.)