I don't disagree with your observations and arguments, but I think there are a couple logic-tripwires somewhere down this trail:
If your premise is that we're in danger of "fighting the last war," what with all of the current focus on Counterinsurgency and Small Wars and the like, and are in danger of intellectually disarming ourselves for any potential High-Intensity Conflict, roger and amen. (Although, as a user, it seems to run philosophically askance of the SWJ website mission. Perhaps it's more of a question for a notional Big Wars Journal?)
To say that Low-Intensity Conflict lessons are 180° wrong, "simply because the enemy is not modern and not competent," seems to invite the same criticism, however. The operational military-political realities faced since the 1960s and for the conceivable future (25 years?), dictate that most theory and practice be focused on LIC, not HIC. To this amateur historian, lessons from the likes of Vietnam, Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq prove that: You can pick your friends, and you can usually pick your fights, but you can't pick your enemies--or how they fight.
That may mean that the infantry now works in a theoretically/tactically topsy-turvy world, but it doesn't mean it's wrong. Consider the following anecdote shared by Schmedlap in a current SWJ thread on defining Information Operations (IO).
Bottom-line: We've gotta keep our collective heads in the current fight, stay intellectually flexible, always do the right thing, generate theory from practice*, vaccinate ourselves against next-war-itis, all while keeping the proverbial Big HIC Stick in our back pockets.
* Yes, got my own intellectual tripwire there. File under "schoolhouse vs. lessons-learned world-views"; cross-reference under "religious conflicts."
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