Assessment of Effects Based Operations

[Ron Humphrey]

Looking at an insurgency as a system, or a system of systems, is dangerously misleading.

Most definately misleading, but not necessarily wrong. Is it the fact that its not a system thats the problem or more that we average folk tend to look at it as more prescriptive rather than enlightening?

William Owen is correct about his comments regarding mechanical systems (closed systems or simple systems) verus open (or complex systems). You can predict the results of a nodal attack on a closed system, but you can only guess what the result will be when you target a node in an open system, because that system will adapt (perhaps in your favor, perhaps not).

Once again that is correct in that if the expectation is to find the silver bullet then yes almost guaranteed failure do to unforseen reactions. However if one uses the systems approach in an attempt to better understand the enemy rather than to define what to do to them is that still a problem? If one thing is certain it should be that critical thinking is required if we are to approach operational environments without being constantly drawn into natural/biased assumptions vs more informed and well thought out approaches.

While targeting important individuals and resources is still an important line of operation, it is a supporting line of effort, it should not be the main effort. The main effort should be focused on changing the environment so the insurgents can't survive there. If you focus on making the environment hostile to them by using good ole COIN doctrine which involves protecting the populace so the insurgents can't coerce support, fixing government problems to undermine whatever cause the insurgents may have, and establishing capable security forces at the local level that can collect and respond to intelligence rapidly (they're the ones who fix and finish the enemy). They don't focus on so called HVI's, but rather all the bad guys to prevent the insurgents from regrouping, thus the goal is to purge an area and put our "systems" in place to prevent their resurgence (functioning gov, security, intelligence, public diplomacy, etc.).

Could not be more in agreement here and I ask you this. Many of us have tried to explain a complex situation to those around us and very often there is confusion of what we say by misperception of those on the recieving end of the discussion(or insufficient ability on our end to adequately explain it).

How often have you found that a commanders intent is one thing to the the commander and by the time it gets two levels down it apparently became something completely different. The thing I guess I'm trying to get at here is that a systems approach can be extremely helpful in the explanation and planning process for ensuring that at least most of the individuals are on the same page as to the overall environmental characteristics. Anything beyond that along the prescriptive lines would seem to be problematic.

As to systems in general perhaps a change in how one looks at that system might represent more of what you mention, Good ol COIN. Although in mapping a system one tends to focus on the nodes much as we usually connect the dots to draw a picture, are the nodes really the important part or rather is it the (what,how,why,where, and whos of what connects them. Those lines represent the true focus of the operation. How do they get around (the people), how do they fund,(the people), what makes them have to move(the people), what is their achilles heel, ETC.

We attempted systems targeting initially during OIF and it largely failed to achieve the desired results, but when we surged and changed the environment to prevent the insurgents from regrouping, that combined with the targeting methodology had a positive impact. Only history will tell how long it will last.

I still support using a systems model on occassion when looking at the insurgency to identify potential vulnerabilities, but the focus must be on the basics, which is changing the environment (it is tough, dangerous, and requires patience). If I can shut down a weapons smuggling ring (system), or a financial support arm (system), that is a bonus, but only a temporary one until they adapt to the disruption. If I can deny the populace to them by setting conditions to get them to actively support the government I can overwhelm the insurgents, vice constantly hitting them with pin pricks. They won't be able to recover from staggering blows.

Slapout if you can find a magic silver bullet for defeating an insurgency please let me know. I have a case of beer saying you can't.

In identifying how difficult it is to take the right approach and how much it requires from those who are leading it haven't you just made the point that more often than not many may not be quite patient enough, or persistent enough, or informed enough to continue the right process without some sort of more basic(said silver bullet) type approaches. Is it not therein that the greatest difficulties are to be found?