Quote Originally Posted by ericmwalters View Post
Like theology, we've got to start with some foundational beliefs. There's a lot of reason and logical edifices that are erected, but none of that means much if you don't buy into the basics.
As I see it, the foundational beliefs postulated are all different ways of describing one thing: exploiting asymmetry with one's opponent. If you have done a good job, you are able to leverage your strengths against your opponent's weaknesses to win That does not necessarily equate to maneuver warfare. And it is no great feat of brilliance to saty that you can probably beat your opponent if you use your advantage well. However, your advantage has to be one upon which you can actually capitalize.
Some examples:
Rommel was able to maneuver much better than the British in N. Africa. He neded to execute all of his operational efforts quickly because he had a limited logistics base to resupply him. He well knew that he could not hope to beat the British once the American industrial base kicked into gear and started delivering. Once that happened, it matter little how well and how quickly Rommel could observe, orient, decide, and attack--he no longer had enough "stuff" in his arsenal to win against the industrial juggernaut whose products were lumbering across the Atlantic. If all you have is pebbles, how quickly you run around an elephant throwning them at him does not really matter. You will never win. And, once you tire yourself out, the elephant can just stomp on you when you have to lie down to rest.
I submit that a similar analysis applies to Napoleon's Russian campaign--no matter how quickly the French were able to campaign, they were unable to overcome the sheer geographical size of the Russian Empire. The asymmetry between "how fast" and "how far" resulted in a mismatch that French speed could never overcome.