I had the experience of being involved in talks with individuals providing support to an insurgent faction in the same city in 2005 and 2007. In each circumstance, we were using what I would call a triangulation approach. There were the irreconciliable elements, the pragmatists, and us. We were trying to turn the pragmatists against the irreconciliables. In 2005, this did not work well for a variety of reasons:
- our lack of sophistication in negotiating the cultural terrain
- immature and sloppy intelligence (single sourced garbage that was little more than hearsay, fabrications, and rumor)
- the lack of flexibility that we had with funds and other support with which to facilitate the pragmatists' actions (the best that we could do was give them some confiscated weapons and limited ammunition)
- a general lack of confidence that the people had in our willingness to follow through, largely due to the political rhetoric back home

In 2007, all of these things factors were a mirror opposite of 2005 and, as a result, we got better results:
  1. Better intelligence helped us to better prepare for such negotiations because:
    • better knowledge of the enemy and the pragmatists helped us to better determine how best to leverage the pragmatists against the enemy
    • better knowledge of the pragmatists helped us to determine what would motivate them (what did they want and what were they willing to accept or concede)
    • a better general understanding of the environment allowed us to discern when we were being lied to and/or what the pragmatists were uninformed about (and then we could decide whether/how to exploit their lack of information)
  2. Greater flexibility and availability of funds gave us the credibility of immediately implementing concessions that would have sounded far-fetched only two years earlier. Being able to fork over cash to pay for something that you agree to lends you tremendous credibility. Equally important, it helps to initiate necessary movement much, much quicker.
  3. In 2005, many, if not most, Iraqis thought we were pulling out. The re-election of Bush, an influx of tens of thousands more troops, and a country-wide push out of the FOBs really helped to reverse that perception. Combine that with our newfound ability to fork out large sums of cash on short notice and it became apparent that we were in it to win it (like Yzerman) and the tribes could trust us to back them up if AQI and AAS fought back too fiercely.


Our level of sophistication in dealing with the tribes also improved markedly, though I think the factors above would have been sufficient. In talking to some leaders, I think they have deluded themselves into thinking that they can make headway with the tribes just through skillful application of brainpower, political savvy, and their dynamic personalities. Aside from very few people having the latter two attributes, the Sheiks are too experienced and well aware of the dangers that they face. They are not going to be won over by a cocksure Army Captain in the same way that a naive college student will swoon at an Obama speech. These guys might have grown up without plumbing and may be illiterate, but they are experts at survival, incredibly savvy when it comes to interpersonal skills, and they can be stone cold, calculating pragmatists with no allegiance outside the edges of their city block. A friend of mine was trying to convince me that he was ready to make headway with the tribes on his upcoming deployment because his Arabic is strong, he's been studying the culture, doing lots of reflecting upon earlier deployments, and so on. My advice to him: Otto von Bismarck comes along once per generation. Don't assume that you're this generation's Bismarck.