But isn't it also relevant to bring up the parallels between Rumsfeld and McNamara's management style? Both were dismissive of military guidance that contradicted their own pre-conceptions. Both were enthusiastic micromanagers. Both appointed military leadership that seemed to be more oriented to agreement with the boss than problem-solving. I think you're right about the military on the ground adapting quicker in Iraq (as the 101st under Petraeus, among others, apparently grasped the concepts of counterinsurgency fairly quickly), but actions by Pentagon-level and above and the lack of a cohesive strategy for victory seem (at least to me) to have rendered many of our combatant commanders' efforts largely ineffective, irrelevant, and/or short-lived. That's where I was trying to draw the parallel with Vietnam...the poor civilian leadership at the top of the chain and a muddy strategy that gives the military forces an almost impossible task to fulfill ("If the strategy is wrong, it doesn't matter how good your tactics are" to paraphrase a quote in the Woodward book). As for the dynamics on the ground, I agree with you that Lebanon is a better parallel than Vietnam.
Bookmarks