I'm writing a paper on civil military relations in non-combat environments - with particular attention to the western Sahel. It seems to me that the Trans-Sahel Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) is too heavily militarized and, thus, insufficiently civilian in nature. In theory, TSCTP is the proverbial three-legged stool with DoD, State and USAID each owning a leg. In reality, DoD is pulling the lion's share of the work.

I propose that this imbalance is due, in part, to inadequate staffing and funding for State and USAID; in part to finding and authorities granted DoD by congress (e.g.: 1206, 1210, etc.); and in part to cultural and structural differences among the three agencies/departments.

If I'm correct, DoD is, through no fault of its own, well into State and USAID lanes to both its credit and consequence. It takes considerably more to train and field a U.S. SOF operator than a USAID or State FSO. Further, using service members to enact public diplomacy or development policy blurs the lines between the three Ds. And, finally, diplomacy and development are professions just as is the conduct of military operations. We shouldn't use SOF to conduct development any more than we should use USAID to capture and kill terrorists.

Is this something that should be fixed? If so what's the best fix; if not, why not?

I'd appreciate comments on this idea as well as any relating to the use of U.S. SOF in embassies in non-combat roles.

V/R.