From Registan by Joshua Foust A Pragmatic Extrapolation from Limited Data

Since 2006, that problem has only gotten worse. While Sherzad itself has a relatively high income (see page 3, pdf), Nangarhar as a whole has only become more violent in the years since Ms. Felbab-Brown wrote that op-ed. What we do know is the extremely erratic behavior of Nangarhar’s opium sector has contributed to economic instability in the province overall, and severe income swings (page 32, pdf). From the data on hand, it is likely that higher incomes—such as Sherzad District, where the Coalition just conducted a noteworthy eradication effort—correspond with opium production. According to the IMF, when Nangarhar province saw a huge drop in opium cultivation under Gul Agha Sherzai’s early tenure in 2005/6, province-wide GDP was about $1.3 billion (which was a big drop from the year before, when there was much more opium). The next year, 2006/7, when opium production spiked 285%, province-level GDP rose to $3.2 billion, only to fall the next year to $1.8 billion as the UNODC declared it poppy-free.

Now, none of this proves any sort of causation, and much of the analysis about current trends is based off that single data point at the start of this post. However, these are the limitations we must work with—there simply are not good, rigorous data sets about the opium market in Nangarhar. The tiny glimpses of it that we have, however, indicate that not only is Nangarhar not at all the model province some U.S. officials seem to want it to be, but that its governor, Gul Agha Sherzai, is far less effective and capable than people have given him credit for.