The Roles and Weapons with the Squad

[AlexTX ret]

Carried weight, human performance, doctrine (tactics?) and training are all more critical issues - or more important than calibre. Put another way, I can't see a need to alter training, (apart from the handling) doctrine and tactics, if I change my main infantry weapon from M4/5.56mm, to an M4/6.5mm, or even an AK/7.62. Actually an optic sight might have more overall impact.

Well we can agree on the advantage of opitics espiecially if it's the new Aimpoint that doesn't need batteries.

However, I fight this point that the weapons don't affect basic doctine all day long. I even asked a question about it in another post. The problem is that it has affected the training and tactics of other countries. The Russians and the Chinese for examples. The Chinese are going through a renaissance of their Infantry tactics since they've cut their dependance on Russian operational doctrine. They are building a new military in all areas, in all directions. However for their Infantry they are creating small units that fight at 400m-500m and their infantry cartridge and rifle is suppose to defeat body armor at those Ranges. This plus a new range of support weapons like their new Multi shot grenade launcher, could put our troops at a serious disadvantage. If an infantryman's fighting tool is so unimportant, was is?

In 1987 I went from using a 7.62mm SLR and GPMG to an all 5.56mm platoon, and tactical doctrine did not miss a beat, except for some very minor issues, caused by now having everyone with a fully automatic weapon. Even today the minor tactics of 1919 remain relevant, regardless of calibre.

I'll ask a question I asked a person today. What area of combat did you prove this to be true? I'm not being an *ssh*le nor am I despariging your record or experiences. But there seems to be a disconnect between the small unit commanders and the bureaucracy. I see no discussion between levels of command about what our basic operational policy is and can it be made better.

IIMO, Fragmentation is the best primary wounding mechanism, for a small calibre round, but it is not useful to suggest that the primary purpose of an infantry round is to break up inside the human body. Perforating cover is just as important - thus the CRISAT criteria. After that, multiple hits would seem to be a very strong determinant in providing the relative state of incapacity required - or much more likely to kill.

Yes but that is becoming more and more questionable. Yes, the prenetration of cover is important. But multiple small calliber hits are showing a certain weakness. There are more and more stories from troops in the field where are getting good hits and the enemy combatant still is capable of firing. Or as one special incident that I got a paper on a few weeks ago. The shortness of the range of the 5.56 round when fired from a IFV meant that try as they may they couldn't hit the enemy effectively. The enemy was quickly reinforced and only the IFV's abillity to speed away saved them from the RPGs shot at them.

All that said, as a point of tactical doctrine, I assert that infantry minor tactics should emphasise the use of projected HE, as the primary means of breaking enemy will. I fully recognise that this has some problematic issues associated with it, but it is a viable solution.

Maybe in rural Afganistan, but in the neighborhoods of Afganistan and Iraq, it really does have its limitations. As the Russians found in Cheznia, only boots on the ground had the capability of knockingout the Cheznians hunter-Killer groups. Of course, they also found out that their Contract Soldier program showed no advantages over conscription. In the final result it was the SOG groups that did the actual fighting.

FRAGMENTATION
The data I have on this is that the M855 cartridge (62-grain, gilded metal-jacketed, lead alloy core bullet with a steel penetrator) will at high velocities, (900m/s) fragment up to 50% after travelling 5-8cm into a 10% gelatine medium. M855 remains intact at velocities below 763m/s, so from an M4 barrel, M855 will not fragment on impact. In fact it will only achieve viable fragmentation (30-20%) out to 100-125m.

However, I think it is fair to say that the actual requirement for immediate incapacitation is a close range issue, bearing in mind that even with multiple fatal wounds into the heart and lungs some men may continue to function, to the degree he can walk and return fire for up to 15-20 seconds.

According to ARDEC, this would account for why some soldiers assume that their fire has not been effective.

First I would like to see the report that these figures come from. They counter what I have seen. However, I live in a dream world that makes it hard to get different views. However, it is unusual that my reports minimize the effects of fragmentation of the SS109/M855 round. This is possible because the latest information I have was a study done on pigs. Cartridge effects is a real science but it seems that we try to turn it into black magic.

As for the length of time that a combatant is effective after being shot and the onset of incapacitation is one of the most controversal parts of determining the effectiveness of a particular cartridge. The Army seems to more interest in keeping the status quo then actually doing tests on the soldiers in the field complaints. I'm not saying they're wrong but nowadays it seems the there is a lot of bias in the reports I read.