Is our open-ended occupation of Afghanistan a good strategic decision? I thought that I was alone in the view that it was not, but Stephen Walt seems to agree with me.

http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/...afe_haven_myth

http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/08/20/safe_haven_2_a_response_to_peter_bergen

I don't see how we expect to completely eliminate safe havens inside Afghanistan after we leave, particularly in light of some of the more dismal assessments of the war. In addition, many of the safe havens are across the border in Pakistan, safe for the most part from Afghan forces, and our own ground troops. It doesn't seem plausible that we will successfully eliminate all of these havens in the region, much less across the globe. This also assumes that if the Taliban were to regain power in Afghanistan (a proposition I am skeptical of anyhow) it doesn't necessarily or even likely follow that they will invite al-Qaeda to set up shop in their country, or even if they did, that it would in any meaningful way improve al-Qaeda's capabilities. The Taliban itself is not a ideologically homogeneous entity, and is furthermore not as global in its aspirations as al-Qaeda is. The camps that were in Afghanistan taught small unit tactics for the most part, which did not play any role in the attacks on American soil. The knowledge necessary to make explosives is also not in any way related to our success or failure in Afghanistan. Bombings targeted at Westerners do not seem to be at all related to the existence of safe havens.

Our presence in Afghanistan seems to have the opposite effect of what we intend. Removed from its state as a "vital national interest" the blood and treasure we have and are expending to try to defeat the insurgency and stabilize the government seems wasted. I, like Walt, do not find the moral argument compelling, nor would I expect the Congress or American people to be willing to expend enormous resources on something that is not necessary, and probably hurts our security in the short term.