The Army Capstone Concept: the Army wants your comments

[William F. Owen]

It is not my intention to be needless rude of provocative here, but having been asked my opinion, here it is.

1. This document serves no useful purpose, as it stands. Doing what it intended should have taken no more 2,500 words and/or 5 pages. Having claimed not to be telling the reader what to think, it then sets out to be telling the reader that the enemy “will do X,” as opposed to “might do X, given Y or Z circumstance, and context, A, B or C.” - and where is the dividing line between Doctrine and Concept?
2. The document lacks clear and precise descriptions, and uses un-clear and highly convoluted language, none of which is helpful. - why use "new terms?"
3. Implicitly this document progresses a vision of conflict that the US Army wishes to fund, and not one based on history. It seems to serve a human and organisational need, rather than a foundation for teaching (Doctrine?).
4. The idea that the US was proficient as “old Warfare” and “new Warfare” is somehow “more complex” and more challenging is untrue, and evidence free.
5. The description is the 2006 Lebanon conflict is highly simplistic, inaccurate, selective and substantially un-true. It is what the US Army wants to believe instead of looking at the facts.

Given the above, the rest begins to fall apart pretty quickly.

As concerns capability you have to wonder about a document that never says “tank,” , and only says “Armor” twice. It says artillery and infantry each only once.
Yet in contrast it mentions :

• the V-22?
• Mentions un-manned 5 times?
• Cyber and network over 30 times?

I can only assume that this is to progress a belief in new technologies and “networks” to serve a budgetary need.
There are some very odd statements such as:
• “The future force requires the support of Joint Synergy (redundancy versus interdependencies) in certain capability areas such as fires and surveillance platforms. – I have no idea what that means.
• The future force requires the capability to conduct combined arms offensive operations and to overcome complex web defenses in complex/urban terrain. – so the US Army does not have this capability? Same capability as 1918 perhaps?

I could go on for another >5 pages, but I hope the largely negative comments so far may serve some useful purpose. There is some good stuff, but that is largely obvious to all, and there is too little of it to bother.