I've been to Zabul and know the problems there pretty well, so I can understand why Hoh was frustrated.
As for what he did, I can certainly see why folks like him would get frustrated and want to resign in despair. However, Holbrooke was right, you can probably have more impact as an internal critic than an external one, especially given that he wasn't/isn't a big name who would get big time, extended attention from the media. He'll say his piece, have his 5 minutes, and likely disappear - so he probably should have stayed in the fight inside if he wanted to maximize impact.
On the issue of the State Department, I think that they should be actively recruiting people like Hoh (or like me for that matter, not that I'm eager to go back there) with experience in/on Afghanistan (and outside relevant expertise) - esp given the complexity of the problem set and the requirements of COIN. Unfortunately, they rotate in folks with inexperience and little desire to be in such a fight --- they want to be in Paris and Brussels doing "diplomacy", not Kabul or out in the country as one leg of the COIN stool!
[the error] --- it is not a failure to send folks like him there, it is a failure to send the same old people in State that in many cases do nothing useful in the rest of the world but have a claim to "experience"! Professionalized bureaucrats have their advantages but we should recognize their deficits as well, particularly for outside the box missions.
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