Economics and Irregular Warfare

[Surferbeetle]

In terms of insurgency as a system, one failed assumption Laites and Wolfe made was assuming that the system is closed. In practice, as with many human endeavors, the system is open, and this distinction allows intervention points when accurately defined.

The study (Rand # R0462,186 pages) referenced by Slapout provides an interesting analysis of insurgency using Algeria, Cuba, Ireland, Malaysia, the Philippines, Spain, the US, and Vietnam among other countries as examples. How endogenous and (cross border) exogenous factors influence an insurgency are discussed beginning on page 22 (34 of the pdf document). Figure 1 on page 35 (page 47 of the pdf) provides a succinct pictorial summary of the open system of an insurgency.

Fali Huang’s paper provides another vantage point in which the clash of interests of a King, Elites, and Workers are examined. Depending upon how one defines the locations of each participant it seems possible to use his model to examine a non-Westphalian system i.e. one which is not confined by national borders.

An insurgency holds an information advantage against the host nation (they can see us, we can't see them)…

The enemy is skilled, but they are not invisible to us. The reach and grasp of our global kill chain is a very long one, however no one has an absolute understanding of the battlefield. We could significantly increase our understanding if we focused upon language/culture/people skills for each of our soldiers but there would still be a delta between us and absolute understanding of the battlefield. To steal a phrase, people are more important than hardware and I would argue that Iraq and Afghanistan have taught many of us that it is cost effective to for our military to increase it’s collective language/culture/people skills.

…they [an insurgency] need people, guns, money, and silence from the populace in order to thrive.

Agreed.

Intuitively, I agree with you if I understand you correctly (shore up the rear/protected areas); however, this action neglects the safe-havens, denied areas, and hinterlands. Given enough time unhindered, the insurgency can continue to grow in their protected areas to the point where they can mass effectively against the host nation (Pakistan last summer was getting close).

The concept of FEBA – aka Forward Edge of the Battle Area (or False Enthusiasm and Bull#### Attitude for cadet veterans ) no longer applies to warfare as presently practiced. Instead we have the creeping amorphous horror that currently plagues parts of our world.

So, what do we do…

1. Big Army/Big Hammer Approach. Clear, Clear, Clear
2. Jim Gant "One Tribe" Approach. Bottom-up FID/micro-COIN
3. Greg Mortenson Approach. Build schools in the hinterlands. Over time, education trumps grievances and the insurgent's message fails.
4. Man-hunting. UAVs, airstrikes, hyper-infantry raids
5. Do nothing.

Oil spot theory is an interesting way to look at things. All geographic and financially interested stakeholders are able to provide spheres of influence…which stakeholders are we empowering and involving? Is this our fight alone?