There are always many ways to achieve any given effect, and what works great in one circumstance may be a complete failure in another. But if one has achieved an understanding of the essence of the problem, then they can tailor their approaches accordingly. This has always been my personal approach to problem solving, and one that we have applied in the Strategy Division at USSOCOM over the past couple of years as well. Personally, I feel that the most useful form of "strategy" is not one of generating ever more vague guidance for ever higher headquarters (like I learned at the War College...) but rather to dive into a problem, peeling back the layers to seek fundamental understanding that can be employed by leaders AT ALL LEVELS of command to achieve effects that collectively contribute to the ultimate strategic effect that one is seeking.
A simple example: the 2-minute push-up event on the Army fitness test. Over the course of my career I have met so many soldiers who "just can't do push-ups." These soldiers are often very motivated, and want to excel, and have read the dozens of articles published by various people who max the test that offer specific work out programs that worked for the author, but not for the frustrated soldier who ultimately resigns him or herself to "not being able to do push-ups."
I thought about this a lot as an LT. "Why” I asked. Not "how." When one shifts their focus from how to why, they are, I believe on a longer journey, but one that will ultimately get them to a much more universally effective answer to the "how" question.
The answer I ultimately came to on this little problem was simply "train for the second minute." As I asked those who couldn't do push-ups how they trained, and then compared that to workout that were generally more successful, and my own personal experience, I came to realize that most people who "just couldn't do push-ups" were constantly replicating the conditions of the first minute of the test in their training programs. You don't max your push-ups in the first minute, it is the ability to do push-ups in the second minute that earns the high score.
Based on this simple concept I developed a couple of example workouts (that I still use to this day for three or four weeks prior to an APFT in lieu of my normal workouts that I use to prepare for life rather than a silly test that doesn't really do that very well) and would simply advise people to train for the second minute, why, point out how their current program doesn't to that, and then offer them a couple examples, but also urge them to find what works for them personally, so long as it follows the second minute principle. Many soldiers who could never do push-ups now do them very well, because they were given a little understanding and encouragement, and then allowed to find their own path to success.
Governance is not unlike this. My one liner there is "Ensure the governance is seen as legitimate in the eyes of the governed." For some cultures an election will create this. For others it comes from some form of councils. For others it may be as simple as a single religious leader saying "this is the guy." Who are we to judge??
We need to judge less, and understand more. Principles are pure, but values are principles with a judgment applied to them. We tend to push values over principles, and no one I know likes to be judged.
When the military is tasked to assist with an insurgency the first questions go to "how do I defeat the insurgent?" I would offer that the first questions should go to "why is there an insurgency?" What I find is that it can almost always be traced back to governance that lacks legitimacy in the eyes of most, or at least some key segment of its populace.
Afghanistan has suffered under nearly 30 years of illegitimate government. Address that first, and the rest will follow. Ignore it, and no amount of good COIN tactics and hard effort are likely to produce more than temporary suppression of the symptoms of the insurgency.
But this is just what I have come to in my own personal journey. Maybe just killing all who dare to challenge the government is enough. Maybe if a government is effective enough the populace will ignore its lack of legitimacy. Maybe. But I don't buy it.
I think that Gen McCrystal's plan for the military in Afghanistan is sound. I have far less confidence in policy decisions that are still rooted in a belief that "official" is good enough. The people of Afghanistan deserve a government that is legitimate as well. And truth be told, it probably would not look much different than what they have now, but it is how it is perceived that matters.
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