Administration officials, particularly Cheney, were very clear in the argument that the only options were Hussein's removal or the emergence of a much strengthened and aggressive Iraq. That was how they shaped discussion to reach the point they wanted--by portraying those as the only two options. If, in fact, those are the only two options, any reasonable person would support intervention. People who tried to paint other options like the continuation of containment were not taken seriously.
With hindsight it seems strange that the administration was able to shape the debate this way--into only two diametric options. I argue this was possible because of the lingering national psychological effects of September 11. An attempt to replicate it today by, say, contending that the only option toward Iran is intervention or a nuclear-armed Iran invading neighboring states, would not be taken seriously.
The realists in the administration---Cheney, Powell, Rumsfeld--were never as enthusiastic about the idea that Iraq could be a catalyst for region-wide democratic change as Bush was. But once Bush started talking about that, the others had to follow along. For the realists, though, it was always about addressing what they saw as a threat rather than starting a revolution. As conservative realists, they were wary of revolution and aware that revolutions often careen out of control. Bush, though, was transfixed by the end of communism in Europe and very badly wanted to replicate Reagan. I believe he saw the flowering of democracy in the former Soviet bloc as the normal process when authoritarian or totalitarian regimes were removed.
Bookmarks