The Snake Eater - Daniel Henninger, Wall Street Journal.

Subject: A case study of how the U.S. got bogged down in Iraq.

Problem: If a cop in Anytown, USA, pulls over a suspect, he checks the person's ID remotely from the squad car. He's linked to databases filled with Who's Who in the world of crime, killing and mayhem. In Iraq, there is nothing like that. When our troops and the Iraqi army enter a town, village or street, what they know about the local bad guys is pretty much in their heads, at best.

Solution: Give our troops what our cops have. The Pentagon knows this. For reasons you can imagine, it hasn't happened.

This is a story of can-do in a no-can-do world, a story of how a Marine officer in Iraq, a small network-design company in California, a nonprofit troop-support group, a blogger and other undeterrable folk designed a handheld insurgent-identification device, built it, shipped it and deployed it in Anbar province. They did this in 30 days, from Dec. 15 to Jan. 15. Compared to standard operating procedure for Iraq, this is a nanosecond.

Before fastening our seatbelts, let's check the status quo. As a high Defense Department official told the Journal's editorial page, "We're trying to fight a major war with peacetime procurement rules." The department knows this is awful. Indeed, a program exists, the Automated Biometric Identification System: retina scans, facial matching and the like. The reality: This war is in year four, and the troops don't have it. Beyond Baghdad, the U.S. role has become less about killing insurgents than arresting the worst and isolating them from the population. Obviously it would help to have an electronic database of who the bad guys are, their friends, where they live, tribal affiliation--in short the insurgency's networks...
Deploying the The Snake Eater in Khalidaya - Bill Roggio's The Fourth Rail.

In the middle of January, I embedded with the joint U.S. Marine and U.S. Army Military Transition Team based in Khalidaya in Anbar province. The MTT was then commanded by Major Owen West. Major West's greatest criticisms of the war effort is our failure to recognize the nature of the insurgency, which in many parts of Iraq is fought by applying what he calls "heavy police tactics," and our failure in to applying the right tools to the problem.

Daniel Henninger of the Wall Street Journal's Opinion Page has written an article about how a group of people looked to solve part of this problem. Mr. Henninger describes the enterprise as such, and well: "This is a story of can-do in a no-can-do world, a story of how a Marine officer in Iraq, a small network-design company in California, a nonprofit troop-support group, a blogger and other undeterrable folk designed a handheld insurgent-identification device, built it, shipped it and deployed it in Anbar province. They did this in 30 days, from Dec. 15 to Jan. 15. Compared to standard operating procedure for Iraq, this is a nanosecond."

Major West, along with Spirit of America, a technology company called CDI, and with a small helping hand from me, fielded "The Snake Eater," a biometric device that photographs, fingerprints and stores data about captured suspected insurgents, and then builds a networked picture on their family, history and activities...