Getting back on track:
Today's Development-Focused Population Centric COIN is very focused on producing effects that I would categorize as "Critical Capabilities." These are capabilities that one would expect to see as outputs of a healthy Populace-Governance relationship. I believe the rationale is that because these things are missing, there is insurgency; so if these things are provided artificially, there will be no insurgency.
I see this as applying the same logic of if one imports thousands of Toyotas, and parks them in rows, that somehow a Toyota factory will appear. Maybe it will, but to me it appears that we focus on the wrong things, that these things cost way too much, and show little promise of producing enduring effects in terms of Good Governance and stability.
The counterinsurgent approach focuses on defeating the insurgent himself. Again, as this approach does not address the root causes, and increases governmental oppression of the populace in the process, it typically merely suppresses an insurgency for some number of days, months, or years.
The Jones Model directs attention to what are admittedly broad concepts, rooted in the top end of Maslow's hierarchy. The theory being that it is abuses of these fundamental, higher order human requirements that drive a populace to insurgency (at least the leadership, the heart and soul of the movement. The rank and file will recognize these causal perceptions, but may be driven by baser issues life, survival, and raising a family).
So under the Jones Model:
1. Security operations remain a critical supporting function. Always remembering that the insurgent is part of the populace, and tailoring violence accordingly. (As ADM Olson recently announced, there must be some counterinsurgent operations in counterinsurgency).
2. "Population-Centric COIN" is fine, but it must be operationalized with a clearer understanding of the nature of Insurgency. Afghanistan is filled with well intentioned professionals and experts in a wide range of disciplines; sadly while some are newly minted "experts" on COIN, few know much about INSURGENCY. One cannot counter what one does not understand.
3. This tool provides a methodology for going after those things the Jones Model identifies as most critical to removing the causal factors of insurgency.
a. The first step is to, by focused district or area, assess and attempt to understand what the populace of that specific area's perceptions are on the 4 causal factors.
b. Step two is to then determine your CVs or those CRs that are most important to that populace and that you are most likely to be able to positively affect.
c. Step three is to then break this down in more detail by determining, across the disciplines of you COIN force, what type of engagement/projects you could specifically do designed to get directly at the CVs. In the example provided, where "justice" is lacking it is assessed that a regular, professional, fair, and assessable court system is lacking. Elements of providing this are ID'd as HVTs.
d. Step four are your HVIs (Individual people or projects) that go toward building that missing capability or capacity that is deemed most likely to address the CV of concern in that community.
e. Step five is to execute all of this in a manner that empowers the HN governance and keeps them to the forefront.
f. Step six is to continue to assess and refine and minimize external influence (by both the FID forces AND the UW forces) at every opportunity.
Updated operationalizing tool:
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