Operationalizing The Jones Model through COG

[Dayuhan]

at some point one does have to make an assessment themselves of how it is they understand that popular perception to be).

Of course we make assessments. When we propose to act on those assessments, though, we do well to remind ourselves that we are acting on our own assessments, which are colored by our own prejudices and preconceptions. We are not acting on behalf of a foreign populace.

So as governance gets more "Poor" the natural trend is for violence to rise. A leader of the dissident groups may opt for a non-violent approach, as Dr Maria Stephan advocates in her work. History shows that it is twice as likely to produce change where no legal means for change exists than violent approaches are.

As I said before, non-violent political action is extremely effective if the cause in question has widespread public support. It wouldn’t have worked for Timothy McVeigh in the US, and it wouldn’t have worked for OBL in Saudi Arabia, for the same reason: they didn’t have the level of support required to make non-violent action effective. Most terrorist groups are in this position, that’s why they resort to terrorism. 300 people waving signs outside a capital is a joke. 300 people going on strike is barely noticed. 300 people setting off bombs in public places is a major event. So if 300 people want a major event, what do they do? Pretty obvious, really.

Now, Dayuhan says how can Saudi Arabia (The decisive point for GWOT IMO) be brought into such conversations, they receive no support from the US, the opposite is true he says. Really? The Saudis sell us discount oil in exchange for our commitment to defend them against all threats, foreign and domestic?? I know the Gulf War was a while ago, but I still remember. The Saudis have three great fears: 1. Iran. 2. Shia in general, but particularly the large oppressed Shia populace whose lands lay within Saudi Arabia atop half of their oil. 3 There entire oppressed populace as a whole. When it comes to countering insurgency, the Saudis never let the grass grow too tall. The should be pros at this, they have been doing it since their inception. Now they get to do it with the full blessing and sanction of the US because they call it "counterterrorism."

I don’t think there is a decisive point for GWOT, because I don’t think there is a GWOT: the term was invented because it made a good sound bite and has persisted with little question, but I don’t think any such thing really exists.

Do the Saudis sell us discount oil? Since when? As far as I know we pay market price for Saudi oil. Once upon a time they used to shave a few cents to keep the market share, which they found useful in diplomatic situations, but they don’t do that now.

Of course we protected the Saudis from external aggression, and of course we’d do it again in the unlikely event that they were threatened by the Iranians. That’s not defense of the Saudi regime, it’s defense of our own interests: letting the bulk of the Gulf oil reserves fall under the control of an overtly hostile power is not and would not be an acceptable outcome for the US, no matter how we feel about the Saudi government. We could threaten that we won’t come to the aid of the Saudis in the event of foreign aggression if they don’t do what we want, but the threat would be hollow, we and they both know it… and it’s not likely that such a threat would earn us any points with any segment of the Saudi populace. Rather the opposite.

Do we have a commitment to defend the Saudis against domestic threats? Not that I know of… and again, threatening to withhold such defense wouldn’t mean much, as the Saudis don’t face any internal threat that they can’t manage themselves. The only time I recall the Saudis asking for external help with an internal security issue was during the seizure of the Grand Mosque back in ’79… and they asked the French. Again, there’s no leverage here that’s going to force the Saudi regime to change their domestic policies.

Of course the Saudis buy arms from us, but those deals are as much to our advantage as theirs: we need the income and the jobs and if we stopped selling the Saudis could buy hardware elsewhere with the greatest of ease.

The Saudi regime’s relationship with its populace is in any event far better today than it was in the 90s, when the economic dislocation of the oil glut and the American military presence provided continuing irritants. The regime dealt with the problem in a most American way: they threw money at it. Lots of money, hundreds of billions. Since the oil price surge the Saudis have poured huge amounts into public sector salary increases, job-creating industries, infrastructure, schools, housing, health care, etc, etc. Of course it’s a straight buyout, but it’s been pretty successful at buying popular passivity. The royals seem to think that most of the populace is quite ok with being ruled by a medieval anachronism as long as the medieval anachronism delivers the goods. So far it looks like they’re right. Of course they haven’t pleased everyone, nobody ever does. Of course it’s not a permanent solution… but that’s not our problem, it’s theirs.

I very much doubt that any portion of the Saudi populace wants to see the US pressuring the Saudi government to do anything. No matter how well-intentioned such pressure actually was, it would be invariably interpreted as self-interested meddling and would provide a propaganda bonanza for anti-American forces. As in many other areas, foreign support for a reform agenda can actually discredit that agenda by making it seem like something that was initiated from the outside.

I’m curious, though… what exactly do you think we could do to force the Saudis to modify their domestic policies, and what specific modifications in Saudi domestic policy would you seek?

Oh, and yes, I do use "Despotism" interchangeably with "Poor Governance."

I'm not sure the equivalence is valid. Certainly by our standards all despotism is bad governance... though as you've said yourself, our standards don't matter, and if the populace is ok with what we think despotic, it's none of our business. But can you not imagine a circumstance in which governance is neither despotic nor good? What if governance is simply inept, or missing? That's not necessarily despotism, but it's not good governance either.

All despotism may be bad governance, but I don't see how that makes all bad governance despotism.

I am a huge fan of the American story, of the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution and our Bill of Rights.

So am I. Brilliant documents, and they've done wonderful things for us. If you want to go on a mission to bring them to the rest of the world, though, please stop the train and let me off, because I see a monumental crash coming.