Building Indigenous Security Forces to match the realities of METT-TC

[Rob Thornton]

Gents,
I really appreciate the feedback, the discussion has already outweighted the value of the paper. I wanted to take a second and give you a sense of some of the things that are happening (or not) here ref. this weekends comments.

From Slapout:

If you can just get it implemented.

In truth its really more about selling parts of it to CF and senior IA types (although the paper was more general and hopefully wil extend beyond Iraqi Security Forces - maybe as Tom had mentioned -" thoughts beyond current ops".) Some senior IA types (06 and above) are making a transition between: what they remember from an old Iraqi Army (manyof whom say they have more credibility because of the "red stripe" ndicating the old staff officers course), what they think somebody else wants to see, and finally in some cases what they might rather be doing - to -what the BN and below level leadership are finding works in this fight right now. There are however some good BDE CDRs who understand - I saw a BDE CDR from across the river on local TV a few night ago who understands very well, but he may have the opposite problem with his BN CDRs - hard to tell. In many ways this reminds me of our Army (or any large institution) where change feels like "geological time". In Iraq's case it will have to be them that make any real changes that are more then just one BN's TTP -

(From Bill)

we have to decide first what the desired endstate (there is not an end state, but a transition point, all security force elements will continue to evolve).

however CF are in a position to influence in a number of ways - but first we'd need some consensus on what that is. The advisory effort is still a work in progress with many TTs left to refine what right looks like. This probably could be a seperate thread, but it might be a good idea to reconsider the relationships between TTs and MSCs (probably attach them right to the DIV HQs (not OPCON or ADCON but attach). It would close the loop between truth on the ground and truth at the higher echelons, give the MSCs more flexibility to apply resources to fix problems and bring problems like "combined interoperability" to light much sooner so solutions can be resourced. A big part of the problem here is communication (SA/SU) between the TTs and MSCs and communications between the various TTs of all flavors who need to share, but are on a myriad of different comms platforms. OK - it was a digression, but I hope it highlights how we might set ourselves up so we can better assist the host nation force to understand its problems and implement solutions.

From Slapout:

The undercover/plain clothes details are going to develop large informant networks, at least if they are any good they should.This is going to require a special payment capability. Most informants are and should be paid in cash. You will have to have special accounting procedures to account for the money and to protect the identities of the informants. This is a critical process, people lives are at stake and it should be handled care.

We are working this. The biggest problem here is there is either not enough money, or because of fear of corruption or someother reason, we've made getting the money into the hands of informants difficult. The enemy however does not have the same inhibitions/restrictions - he is able to use extremes that oscillate between payoffs and murder. Money right now is the currency that will get the average guy on the street to talk, particularly if provided by the Iraqis - the target audience is the desperate guy (who might otherwise plant an IED), or could be used to turn a lightweight detainee into a snitch. The IA understand it, but currently rely on mostly CF funds to pay detainees. Future (and current) may need to relook how such funds are used and how we might use some different metrics to justify larger expenditures - example - there is a psychological and information aspect to the use of money that we (the conventional folks) don't fully grasp - because we are not nearly so desperate to understand how a man will risk his life for $25 -$100 to plant an IED. My Dad was a police officer in Nashville for 25 years, he worked as a patrolman, a detective and for the last few years before he retired running the evidence room. Large sums of $$$, drugs, weapons, and other confiscated high value items were there - there is not really anything like that here. If there were, it might be put to use financing operations, outfitting special units, etc. I think all the TTs and ISF cells could really benefit from having some senior big city experienced LE types to help shape the emerging security environment.