Important book. Some of it is annoyingly and not usefully academic, but the basics are extremely sound and well reasoned. I strongly recommend it.Originally Posted by Chris jM
As concerns Lind's book, I think I have covered it extensively on other threads.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
The idea that the IDF do or adhere to something called "MW" is a myth generated by the MW camp, based on a poor understanding of how the Israelis actually work. For example, what some folk think is "mission command" is very different from what a lot of IDF officers think is mission command.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
True, my bad. I was really getting at the fact that MW ideology aspires to achieve the kind of decentralized, adaptive and audacious leadership shown by the Israeli's in 1956/67. My point was then that the Israeli way of war at the time enabled them to undertake those kinds of campaigns, whereas the British system is orientated in a different direction in the realm of war-fighting.
'...the gods of war are capricious, and boldness often brings better results than reason would predict.'
Donald Kagan
Mission Command
Wilf,
Please elaborate as I am now intrigued; what do IDF officers regard as Mission Command?
Do you have a good book on the IDF you could recommend? I am going through "34 Days: Israel, Hezbollah, and the War in Lebanon" by Amos Harel which is whetting my appetite to learn more.
RR
"War is an option of difficulties"
They do not have one version of it, nor where they really aware that they were doing it, till the MW crowd started talking about it. Essentially, it means doing your best and not giving up. Inaction is simply never permissible. Action is expected. The man on the spot is expected to know best and act accordingly.
What the UK calls "Mission Command" they call "Command."
34 Days is OK, but there are a number of errors, because it was written too soon after the conflict.Do you have a good book on the IDF you could recommend? I am going through "34 Days: Israel, Hezbollah, and the War in Lebanon" by Amos Harel which is whetting my appetite to learn more.
Reuven Gal's "A Portrait of the Israeli Soldier" is old, but it's a good start.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Oh, those were the days!
In an effort to get back to the original question, not seeing a Main Effort for the WOT; I have to agree, I don’t see one either. The US military has taken a considerable step back from MW. We (the Marines) worked the concept very hard in the early 80’s. Major Wyly (then) initially called it the “Point of Main Effort”. The problem with that term is that it sent all of us AWS students to our maps looking for the ME between grid lines. The Marines later changed the term to “Focus of Effort”. Also remember the Maneuver Warfare Hand book is an early effort.
Col Wyly would probably call the ME the unit that the commander would use to accomplish a decisive decision on the battlefield. It is a unifying tool in that all other units then become supporting units because whatever decisions their commanders make, those decisions must contribute to the success of the ME. As we tried to work our way through this concept, we found that you first needed a commander’s intent and then a ME. We also learned that the two (Commander Intent and ME) could not exist separately but were dependent on one another.
Assuming that the WOT is at the strategic level, and understanding there was never a ME designated; and looking at the history of the WOT; I would have to say that the first ME was the CIA and its invasion and take down of Afghanistan in 2001. It was there that the ME shifted from the CIA to DOD (Rumsfeld). I didn’t say you would like it but that is my opinion regarding a historically example of a strategic ME.
That is solid gold!!!!!!!! strangely according to the book the 5! original concepts of his "fundamentals of tactics" were reduced to 3 for the whole Amphibious Warfare Class. Mission Tactics,Main Effort,Surfaces and Gaps. The concept of the Objective and the Reserve were taught only to his (Col. Wyly's)"Den" according to the book. And yet the concept or rather the confusion over the difference between a Mission vs. an Objective was and is one of the most important parts of the book.
In Wyly's later lectures he did specifically state that the Main Effort was not just a unit (what) but also a where, you can't have one without the other and then he goes to further state as you(Polarbear) have that it all works together.
The Marine Corps has lost something by deviating from the orginal core concepts IMO it's the basis of a whole new 5 Rings theory IMO
But Colonel Warden's designation of a "Key Force" has a lot of similarities to the concept of a "Main Effort."
In Colonel Wyly's Own Words
"Consider the principle of the objective. Remember, the main effort is where you determine you are going to do something decisive. That should be what you do when you select an objective. Therefore, there is a relationship."
From Colonel Wyly's Lecture No.3-The Main Effort.
Memories!
True the ME is also a where and part of the where is "The Commander should be with his ME (not to supervise but to support (or shift the ME). Take a look at "Panzer Leader" - p.100 Guderian talks about a battalion commander, the brigade CO and the division commnader along with himself all observing a ME attack. Do you have a date on those Wyly lectures...to me it sounds like your dabbling in the early stuff...not that it was wrong but a lot of evolution continued to turn from 81 to 89-90 or so.
Last edited by Polarbear1605; 06-11-2010 at 10:32 PM.
I was using the Maneuver Warfare Philosophy this afternoon. My higher headquarters (wife) gave me the Mission of getting some stuff for a B-B-Que this weekend. Since no one was available for me to delegate the mission to I became the Main Effort and as such I selected the Objective of Winn Dixie. While en route to the Objective I negotiated the Surfaces (road construction and auto accident) by finding Gaps (detours) to the Objective.
Upon my arrival at the Objective I discovered I could not accomplish my Mission based upon the lack of good Ribs for B-B-Que even though I had secured the Objective, but as in rapid war like circumstances the Objective was no longer relevant. Since selection of the Objective is part of the responsibility of the ME commander I selected another Objective and began to travel toward it again mindful of the Surfaces and Gaps. This time upon arriving at the Objective the correct Pork Ribs and Beer were acquired and I returned to home base and reported to Higher that the Mission had been accomplished.
MW is a whole new theory of life
Warfighting and Maneuver Warfare
I've looked at John Schmitt, 1989 FMFM 1 Warfighting and John Schmitt, 1997 MCDP 1 Warfighting, which both have sections on Maneuver Warfare.
The 1989 version is fairly short:
The 1997 version seems to follow the above (I did not do a word for word) and adds but a paragraph to its MW section:MANEUVER WARFARE
The Marine Corps concept for winning under these conditions is a warfighting doctrine based on rapid, flexible, and opportunistic maneuver. But in order to fully appreciate what we mean by maneuver we need to clarify the term. The traditional understanding of maneuver is a spatial one; that is, we maneuver in space to gain a positional advantage. However, in order to maximize the usefulness of maneuver, we must consider maneuver in time as well; that is, we generate a faster operational tempo than the enemy to gain a temporal advantage. It is through maneuver in both dimensions that an inferior force can achieve decisive superiority at the necessary time and place.
Maneuver warfare is a warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy's cohesion through a series of rapid, violent, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which he cannot cope.
From this definition we see that the aim in maneuver warfare is to render the enemy incapable of resisting by shattering his moral and physical cohesion--his ability to fight as an effective, coordinated whole--rather than to destroy him physically through incremental attrition, which is generally more costly and time-consuming. Ideally, the components of his physical strength that remain are irrelevant because we have paralyzed his ability to use them effectively. Even if an outmaneuvered enemy continues to fight as individuals or small units, we can destroy the remnants with relative ease because we have eliminated his ability to fight effectively as a force.
This is not to imply that firepower is unimportant. On the contrary, the suppressive effects of firepower are essential to our ability to maneuver. Nor do we means to imply that we will pass up the opportunity to physically destroy the enemy. We will concentrate fires and forces at decisive points to destroy enemy elements when the opportunity presents itself and when it fits our larger purposes. But the aim is not an unfocused application of firepower for the purpose of incrementally reducing the enemy's physical strength. Rather, it is the selective application of firepower in support of maneuver to contribute to the enemy's shock and moral disruption. The greatest value of firepower is not physical destruction--the cumulative effects of which are felt only slowly--but the moral dislocation it causes.
If the aim of maneuver warfare is to shatter the enemy's cohesion, the immediate object toward that end is to create a situation in which he cannot function. By our actions, we seek to pose menacing dilemmas in which events happen unexpectedly and faster than the enemy can keep up with them. The enemy must be made to see his situation not only as deteriorating, but deteriorating at an ever-increasing rate. The ultimate goal is panic and paralysis, an enemy who has lost the ability to resist.
Inherent in maneuver warfare is the need for speed to seize the initiative, dictate the terms of combat, and keep the enemy off balance, thereby increasing his friction. Through the use of greater tempo and velocity, we seek to establish a pace that the enemy cannot maintain so that with each action his reactions are increasingly late--until eventually he is overcome by events.
Also inherent is the need for violence, not so much as a source of physical attrition but as a source of moral dislocation. Toward this end, we concentrate strength against critical enemy vulnerabilities, striking quickly and boldly where, when, and how it will cause the greatest damage to our enemy's ability to fight. Once gained or found, any advantage must be pressed relentlessly and unhesitatingly. We must be ruthlessly opportunistic, actively seeking out signs of weakness, against which we will direct all available combat power. And when the decisive opportunity arrives, we must exploit it fully and aggressively, committing every ounce of combat power we can muster and pushing ourselves to the limits of exhaustion.
The final weapon in our arsenal is surprise, the combat value of which we have already recognized. By studying our enemy we will attempt to appreciate his perceptions. Through deception we will try to shape his expectations. Then we will dislocate them by striking at an unexpected time and place. In order to appear unpredictable, we must avoid set rules and patterns, which inhibit imagination and initiative. In order to appear ambiguous and threatening, we should operate on axes that offer several courses of action, keeping the enemy unclear as to which we will choose.
The 1989 version then goes to its section PHILOSOPHY OF COMMAND. The 1997 version inserts a section ORIENTING ON THE ENEMY and then PHILOSOPHY OF COMMAND.Besides traits such as endurance and courage that all warfare demands, maneuver warfare puts a premium on certain particular human skills and traits. It requires the temperament to cope with uncertainty. It requires flexibility of mind to deal with fluid and disorderly situations. It requires a certain independence of mind, a willingness to act with initiative and boldness,
an exploitive mindset that takes full advantage of every opportunity, and the moral courage to accept responsibility for this type of behavior. It is important that this last set of traits be guided by self-discipline and loyalty to the objectives of seniors. Finally, maneuver warfare requires the ability to think above our own level and to act at our level in a way that is in
consonance with the requirements of the larger situation.
Chapter 4, The Conduct of War, section headings in 1989
—The Challenge
—Maneuver Warfare
—Philosophy of Command
—Shaping the Battle
—Decision Making
—Mission Tactics
—Commander's Intent
—Focus of Effort
—Surfaces and Gaps
—Combined Arms
Chapter 4, The Conduct of War, section headings in 1997
—The Challenge
—Maneuver Warfare
—Orienting on the Enemy
—Philosophy of Command
—Shaping the Action
—Decisionmaking
—Mission Tactics
—Commander’s Intent
—Main Effort
—Surfaces and Gaps
—Combined Arms
—Conclusion
Now, having eaten up too many bytes showing what my question is based on, my question is:
What is (are) the major difference(s) - if any - between 1985 Lind-Wyly vs 1989 Warfighting vs 1997 Warfighting ?
Regards
Mike
According to the book the lectures started in the fall of 1981.
jmm99 from the my original post the 5 basic concepts are the difference. The first 3 have remained constant through all editions. The last 2 Objective and Reserve were deleted.....serious mistake IMO and the other 2 editions you mentioned have added other items to list without adding any real value IMO.
That is why I was so interested in seeing the original documents. The original truth. The lecture on the Objective is so critical IMO that leaving it out almost jeopardizes the whole theory. Why this was done I still don'tknow especially since some of the context on why we lost Vietnam would seem very relevant to the situation in Afghanistan and the War on Terror or whatever we are calling nowadays.
If it was applied today the Mission: would be be to kill capture UBL and his AQ associates. The Objective would have to be the Whole World!!!! otherwise you could never accomplish your mission, because each local objective (location of the enemy) could change quickly. For that reason Wyly points out that you assign Missions BUT never assign Objectives. Objectives are chosen by lower level commanders based upon what and where the enemy Currently is, which may change at any moment. Makes sense to me.
Last edited by slapout9; 06-12-2010 at 03:28 AM. Reason: fix stuff
I'm not sure this stands up to much scrutiny. The Surfaces and gaps deal is a very odd conception of reading ground and/or an enemy defence. More over how do you use it in defence?Colonel Wyly "The Fundamentals Of Tactics."
He lists 5:
1-Surfaces and Gaps
2-Mission Tactics
3-The Main Effort
4-Concept Of The Objective
5-Concept Of The Reserve
Mission tactics or mission command?
The ME is not part of MW. It's inherent to Command, as is the Objective and the Reserve. This is also confusing for a lot of folks because they get confused between the "Mission" and the "Objective."
All pretty wooly stuff in my view.
Tactics is not one discrete area of training that can be reduced to "5 things". Tactics has to be framed within a level of Command (Platoon, Company) but that is because of how you teach it, or how it should be taught.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
The 5 was just the start
Yep!...basically it didn't...but the concepts continued to build and grow with the USMC Warfighting manual FMFM 1. Remember at the time we were trying to figuer out what MW was based on the Boyd "Patterns of Conflict" Brief and all those damn arrows
Rorschach of Conflict is a better title. I was just re-reading "Patterns" the other day. I just don't see it personally. How this ever got as far as it did, is a mystery to me, especially in the UK.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Rorschach! Oh ya...know what you mean
Rorschach...lol...good discription! Agree but in its defense the slides are probably 25% of the information. Boyd's "Patterns" brief was 8+ hours of talking directly at and about those slides and Boyd talked like a M-60 machinegun. Unfortunately, except for the slides, Boyd never wrote his stuff down...I remember Lind and Wyly joking they were going to lock Boyd into an office and trade food for manuscript pages.
...and why? I asked Bill Lind this and no one seem to know. Boyd was working in the age of video tapes and cassettes. No ever seems to have recorded his presentations as a whole or sat down with him and asked him to do it.
What we have of someone who died in 1995, and was prominent from 1982 onwards is almost nothing, except several versions of some slides and the odd bit if video.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Oh remembering the Battles!
Really they are all the same. 1981 to 1985 Lind and Wyly were rebels sowing an insurgence at the grass roots level (Captain level). There was no offical support for the thing until General Grey got involved when he was the 2nd Division Commander. At one point Wyly would be sent to the career "plenalty box" and later released by Grey. Of course, when Grey became Commandant MW became a done deal. I think it was 82-83 the Commandant (Kelly maybe) make a public statement that MW folks needed to stop meeting in the cellars of DC. That was a direct reference to the unoffical AWS MW seminar that met at Lind's house once a week. The Wyly and Lind stuff "evolved" into the 1989 version of Warfighting.
lol...I did
I am surprised Lind didn't tell you. I reason I heard Boyd never wrote it down, on several occasions, was Boyd was afraid the Russians would get it. After AWS I learned my lesson and when a student at CSC I did record the brief on cassette. I guess I need to get that converted to CD so I can post it/send it out.
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