The problem in Afghanistan is not that they historically employ patronage systems throughout their governance and economy; the problem is that the current Constitution sets it so that EVERYBODY in Afghanistan is either INCLUDED in governance and opportunity; or EXCLUDED from governance and opportunity depending on their connection to ONE MAN.

This is what created the Ponzi effect. Before patronage gathered and distributed goodness at all levels; most staying at that local level, but some going up to higher. Leaders largely were selected locally and drew their legitimacy from the populaces they served.

Under the current Constitution, not only does every government official owe his position (sometimes with a degree or two of separation) to Karzai; so too does every major economic enterprise; so too does every major land owner.

If Karzai is removed, then not only does every single pol lose there job; but every single person in Afghanistan with a good job or good land is likely to lose that as well. It is an all or nothing system. There is no way such a system cannot be corrupt and there is no way such a system can produce legitimate governance.

They problem is not patronage, the problem is a framework that accentuates and elevates the negative aspects of patronage. By understanding that the lack of legitimacy of the central governance is far more contributive to instability and insurgency than the presence of warlords; one can design a system that produces and protects the things that are important.

Karzai would argue the the current constitute;ion does I suspect; but that is valuing maintaining his own power over establishing stability in his country. We should not enable this situation; but we are. We enable it with our presence and with our money. We do this because we don't understand insurgency, not because we don't understand Afghanistan.

Once we get past COIN tactics and step back to take form a clearer perspective on insurgency itself, I think new, and more effective COAs begin to emerge.

The constitution is not the problem, but it codifies and enables behavior that contribute significantly to the problem. Plus its far cheaper to re-write a constitution than it is to manage the effects of Insurgency that are fueled by the current version.